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Law enforcement officers in the U. S. are granted the legal authority to issue 
commands to citizens and to compel citizen compliance through legal sanction, arrest, 
and even physical force. This research examines compliance interactions between police 
officers and citizens to examine the factors that influence voluntary compliance from 
citizens to officer commands.  
Findings are based on content analyses of 250 officer/citizen interactions captured 
by police cruiser mounted video systems used by police departments in two North 
Carolina cities. The influence of 31 factors on citizen compliance, suggested primarily by 
the theories of Social Interactionism and Judgmental Heuristics, were analyzed using 
Ordinal Logistic Regression. Six factors were shown to have a significant effect upon 
citizen’s degree of compliance, including: citizen emotionality, initiation of the 
interaction, officer use of threats, citizen initial compliance, officer respect for citizen, 
and department-type of the officer involved. The implications for further research are 
discussed, as well as the potential usefulness of “dash cam” footage from police cruiser 
mounted video systems for further sociological research.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 In modern America, those sworn to uphold and enforce the law are diverse. 
Federal, state, and local governments empower men and women to uphold the rule of law 
through a myriad of different tasks. Special agents and detectives work alongside 
administrators and regulators. However, it is the street level patrol officer who has 
become the symbol of American law enforcement. “Beat cops” inhabit the thin boundary 
line where the civilian world touches the criminal justice system. These men and women 
are the first, and usually the only, face that will personify the character of the law to the 
average citizen.  
The patrol officer is entrusted with the responsibility of not only enforcing the law 
but also maintaining order and peace within his or her jurisdiction. This law enforcement 
and order maintenance work of a cop involves many different skills and abilities. Paper 
work and reporting skills are essential to the work of patrol officers, as are driving and 
investigative abilities. However, dealing with citizens is the key skill of a beat cop. 
Specifically, patrol officers must engender basic obedience from citizens. Fortunately, 
obedience is an almost universal attribute of human behavior, and individuals who 
frequently commit blatant acts of disobedience are rare. Even the most disobedient 
offenders are obedient in the vast majority of situations and interactions. Yet, it is the 
management of these atypical noncompliance situations by which law enforcement 
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professionals prove their worth. Police “officers routinely judge each other by their 
success in achieving compliance” (Mastrofski, Snipes and Supina, 1996:269).  
The work of law enforcement and order maintenance cannot be accomplished by 
an officer without citizen compliance. However, the means of achieving this obedience 
can vary as much as the personalities of the cops themselves. The arsenal of the police 
officer would lead the average observer to conclude that it is through force and threat of 
force that compliance is secured and order is maintained in this country.  
“Police force has long been a central focus among those who have studied the 
police” (Terrill and Mastrofski 2002:215). Yet, we find that the use of force is not the 
primary tool of influence used by law enforcement. “Examination of the communication 
processes between police and civilians shows that force and coercion are relatively rare in 
police interaction with civilians” (Sykes and Brent 1983:1). By the same token, research 
finds that exercising the power of arrest does not consume the time of police. “The most 
cursory observation of patrol officers on the job overturns the imagery of people who 
make their living parceling citizens into jail” (Black 1980:86). In fact, arrest often is not 
even a possible response to many situations. So if direct physical force and arrest are not 
the chief ways in which police officers achieve compliance from citizens, how are the 
goals of law enforcement and order maintenance achieved? 
“From the perspective of law enforcement agents, then, compliance means 
conforming behavior to a standard of conduct that is set by normative or political means” 
(Reiss 1984:92). Citizen compliance can be subdivided into two types, involuntary and 
voluntary. Involuntary compliance is obtained through some type of use of force on the 
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part of a police officer. The types of physical force include, but are not limited to, the use 
of: soft- or hard-hand techniques, chemical sprays, less lethal technologies such as 
beanbag rounds, impact weapons such as collapsible batons, firearms, and the 
brandishing of any of said weapons. Involuntary compliance is based on a citizen 
following an officer’s verbal command because of pain inflicted by the implementation 
of physical force by an officer, or because they are attempting to avoid such 
implementation of physical force after a weapon is brandished.  
Voluntary compliance, conversely, is any obedience by a citizen to the verbal 
commands of a police officer without the use of physical force or the brandishing of a 
weapon. Richard Sykes and Edward Brent (1983:25) make the observation that “a 
measure of a good police officer is his ability to handle a difficult situation without use of 
violence, and in the case of minor violations, without arrest.” With this view in mind, I 
examine the factors that influence voluntary compliance in police-citizen encounters. 
 I examine officer/citizen compliance interactions by viewing footage from police 
cruiser mounted video systems. The Kernersville Police Department, located in 
Kernersville, North Carolina, and the King Police Department, located in King, North 
Carolina, both granted access to their video databases. I examine footage of interactions 
from each of these two jurisdictions in order to examine the question: what factors 
influence the likelihood of citizen voluntary compliance to the commands of a law 
enforcement officer during an interaction?  
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CHAPTER II 
 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATION 
 
 
In order to investigate the factors that influence voluntary compliance by citizens, 
I conducted a sociological study of officer/citizen interactions. This research focused on 
and was guided by the social interactionist perspective and the theory of judgmental 
heuristics. First, however, it is necessary to briefly explore sociology’s tradition 
concerning theories of power and obedience, concepts foundational to the investigation of 
my question.  
 Sociologists have wrestled with issues of obedience and power since the inception 
of the science of Sociology. Power, in all its macro and micro forms, is the term that 
sociologists use to understand the practice of compliance. Conflict theorists, most notably 
Karl Marx, believe society is primarily shaped by competition over scarce resources. All 
types of social and individual power proceed from this basic economic reality. This 
school of thought places “emphasis on how inequality and stratification generate conflicts 
between social classes” (Turner 2001:7) and how this conflict is expressed as power. A 
conflict theorist is interested in how power is exerted, by whom and against whom.  
Conflict theory also applies its understanding of power to the work of law 
enforcement, the focus of this research. According to conflict theorists, the position of the 
elite is maintained because “the dominant groups can see to it that their particular 
definitions of normality or deviance will become enacted as law, ensconced in public 
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policy, and protected by the operation of the criminal justice system” (Akers and Sellers 
2004:196). Thus, in a capitalist society, the elite who exercise control over the means of 
production have the ability to accumulate capital and then use their economic power to 
subjugate the working class in all other spheres of life.  
 The capitalistic “form of production creates its own legal relations (and) form of 
government” (Marx 1857:88). The elite use this cultural and social power to promote 
obedience to ideas, which perpetuates the status quo. Marx (1857) states that, under 
capitalism, “production can be carried on better under the modern police” (88). 
Therefore, the police simply represent the armed mercenaries of the elite, who enforce 
the current unequal distribution of resources with violence and incarceration of those who 
threaten the interests of the bourgeoisie. In the view of conflict theorists, compliance to 
law enforcement is a result of the violent intimidation that the bourgeois wield over the 
lower classes in order to maintain the status quo.  
 Max Weber agreed with Marx concerning the influence of economic wealth as it 
relates to broader social power. Weber termed this aspect of control “class power.” 
However, he also theorized that a second form of influence was present in society, that of 
“status power.” Status power is exerted based on an individual’s level of charisma. 
“Weber always used the term charisma in the sense of an ‘extraordinary quality’ 
possessed by persons or objects” (Bendix 1960:299). Weber understands the power of 
policing agencies as either an expression of class power, wherein economic conditions 
are protected, or as an expression of status power, which is passed from a dynamic leader 
to a stable organization. For example, in communities living under the legal code of 
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Sharia, those who police their communities in order to enforce adherence to principles 
laid out in the Qur’an draw their power from the outgrowth of the status power of 
Muhammad himself.  
 Functional theorists assume that power is given to governing bodies in an act of 
vested self- interest by members of society. “Functional theory always asks the question 
of how a particular phenomenon operates to meet the survival needs or requirements of a 
larger social system, as the latter seeks to adapt to its environment” (Turner 2001:6). 
According to Durkheim, “when society is strongly integrated, it holds individuals under 
its control, [and] considers them at its service” (Durkheim 1897:209). Law enforcement 
agencies are an example of how “society creates the machinery of control in order to 
protect itself against the ‘harmful’ effects of deviation, in much the same way that an 
organism mobilizes its resources to combat an invasion of germs” (Erikson 1966:8). 
According to functionalist theory, members of society place law enforcement officers in a 
position of authority because this position of authority is necessary to insure the public 
good. A functionalist perspective would contend that those who defy the power of the 
police are those who are not fully bound to society and thus not supportive of society’s 
goals. Therefore, the degree to which individuals are bonded to society is the 
approximate degree to which they obey the commands of police officers.  
Exchange theorists, including Peter Blau (2003), understand all social relations to 
be the result of social exchanges. Just as economic relations develop in a market of 
economic exchanges, social relations develop in a market of social exchanges. However, 
just as inequality develops in economic exchanges, it is similarly produced in social 
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exchanges. When such inequality is present, power is created, along with a variety of 
social methods which serve to mitigate the power disparity of the social exchange. 
Deference to the commands of those with power, for example police officers, serves to 
balance inequality in a social exchange. Thus, law enforcement’s power stems from a 
higher social position, which demands deference in order to equalize the social exchange 
of the interaction. Furthermore, the ability to obtain compliance can be seen as a resource 
in and of itself. According to Blau (2003), “willingness to comply with another’s 
demands is a generic social reward, since the power it gives him is a generalized means, 
parallel to money, which can be used to attain a variety of ends” (as cited in Allan 
2006:134). 
Conflict theory, functional theory and the theory of social exchange offer 
explanations of macro- level phenomena which influence compliance. In other words, 
they express an explanation of the structures and cultural forces that shape the lives of 
individuals. Macro theories offer an explanation of society which rests on the existence of 
social structures. These theories assume that every individual’s “action is constrained by 
culture and structure, [and thus] it is more predictable” (Turner 2001:3). However, the 
breadth of scope of these theories diverts attention from the actual interactions of 
individuals. Because I am concerned with the act of compliance or noncompliance in a 
particular type of interaction, that which takes place between officers and citizens, it is 
more practical to seek out micro-level theories. These micro- level theories “give primacy 
to action” (Turner 2001:3) rather than social structures and thus examine the processes of 
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face-to-face interactions, looking for clues as to what factors influence compliance 
interactions.  
Social Interactionism 
The social interactionist (SI) perspective is first and foremost “an attempt to 
provide a comprehensive theory of goal-oriented or instrumental aggression” (Tedeschi 
and Felson 1993:295). This perspective views compliance as one of the main goals of 
aggression. According to social interactionisim, “a coercive action [one form of 
aggression] is one where the intent is either to impose harm on another person or to force 
compliance” (Tedeschi and Felson 1993:296). Compliance interactions, according to this 
perspective, would be better characterized as aggression interactions. However, 
aggression and violence, though closely related, should not be confused with one another. 
My research focuses on compliance to verbal commands, which is elicited 
without the use of force; yet all compliance interactions, as the social interactionist 
perspective points out, contain varying degrees of implicit or explicit aggression. 
Uniformed law enforcement officers in the United States are, with few exceptions, 
always armed, and thus their interactions contain an implicit element of aggression. 
Furthermore, when an officer issues a command to a citizen, assuming that command is 
legal, the citizen is under a legal obligation to obey that command with the penalty for 
noncompliance being an arrestable misdemeanor. In other words, compliance interactions 
involving a police officer are inherently aggressive due to the fact that they carry an 
implicit and/or explicit threat of arrest. Social interactionist theory assumes that all 
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compliance interactions are aggression interactions, which may or may not be the case. 
However, an officer/citizen interaction is much more blatantly aggressive than many.  
The social interactionist perspective rests on three main assumptions concerning 
the behavioral patterns of human beings. First, this perspective borrows from rational 
choice theory in its belief that individuals weigh costs and benefits of various possible 
behaviors. Rational choice theory (RCT) was developed by Gary Becker in 1968 as an 
application of an economic theory to the study of Criminology (McCarthy 2002:417). 
This theoretical framework is an intellectual descendent of the classical school of 
Criminology. “The rational choice approach to crime assumes that crime can be 
understood as if people choose to offend by using the same principles of cost-benefit 
analysis they use when selecting legal behaviors” (McCarthy 2002:422).  
Second, according to the social interactionist perspective, situational factors are 
influential to the progression of compliance interactions. For example, according to SI the 
presence of a third party will affect the development of an interaction. Any relationship 
that exists between actors involved in an interaction also will influence the outcome, as 
will “the dynamic interchange between them” (Tedeschi and Felson 1993:296). Social 
interactionist theorists view compliance interactions as a type of aggressively changed 
situation. Thus, SI theory explores the ways that location, time, and presence of other 
persons mitigate or contribute to “the dynamic interchange that occurs as aggressive 
incidents escalate” (Tedeschi and Felson 1993:2).  
Third, “a social interactionist perspective requires an understanding of the 
phenomenology of actors” (Tedeschi and Felson 1993:296). The SI theorist takes into 
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account the expectations, reasoning, and principles of an individual during compliance 
interactions. This point-of-view also takes into consideration the belief structure of actors 
as they decide upon compliance or noncompliance. “Thus, beliefs about justice and 
equity, the assignment of blame, and the accounts that people give to justify their 
behavior is central” (Tedeschi and Felson 1993:2). In the view of this theory, internal 
factors that are unique to an individual in an interaction are crucial to understanding why 
decisions concerning compliance are made. However, the difficulty that arises is that 
decision-making processes, and personal beliefs which influence these processes, are 
difficult to explore.  
 The social interactionist perspective is useful for the examination of police-citizen 
encounters because it touches on a number of factors which may influence a given actor’s 
decision concerning compliance. “The interactionist approach adds the possibility that 
outcomes are not preordained by actors’ status characteristics but rather can take many 
paths, depending on choices made by actors as events unfold” (Mastrofski et al. 
1996:272-273). This perspective also provides the possibility for the exploration of 
officer impact and influence on a compliance-seeking situation. This scope “allows 
researchers to explore many of the practical aspects of police work, things that officers 
can choose (how to present themselves, how to behave towards citizens)” (Mastrofski et 
al. 1996:273). Such an exploration can yield practical data, which might allow police 
officers to increase the likelihood of voluntary compliance among citizens, thereby 
increasing officer and citizen safety.  
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According to SI, individuals comply with commands for both normative and 
instrumental reasons. Normative reasons are defined as the tendency to conform because 
of a culturally standard set of behaviors expected in certain situations. In the case of 
interactions with police officers, it is “that one heeds the law because it seems morally 
right or because those who make or enforce the law have the right to tell us what to do” 
(Mastrofski et al. 1996:273). Thus, variables having to do with social bondedness of a 
citizen and a citizen’s perspective concerning the legitimacy of law enforcement and a 
particular officer’s commands will influence the citizen’s likelihood of voluntary 
compliance.  
Social interactionism proposes that citizens are more likely to comply with the 
commands of an officer to the degree that the citizens are invested in society, as 
measured by the degree to which individuals are members of dominant cultural groups. 
SI’s normative influences correspond to Travis Hirschi’s control theory. Hirschi theorizes 
“that people whose bond to society is weak or broken are more likely to engage in 
delinquent acts” (Renzetti, Curran and Carr 2003:117). Control theory itself grew out of 
Durkheim’s concept of “egoism, in which the individual ego asserts itself to excess in the 
face of the social ego and at its expense” (Durkheim [1897] 1951:209). This idea that an 
alienation from conventional society decreases the likelihood of an individual’s voluntary 
compliance in a citizen-officer encounter also presents the possibility of a given person 
ascribing to an alternate subculture that proscribes disobedience to law enforcement. 
“Sanctions are thought in many cases to stimulate pride in the defiance of the law when 
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people are so socially marginalized that they identify with peers who take noncompliance 
as a badge of honor” (Mastrofski et al. 1996:278). 
Another normative variable in the police-citizen encounter that might influence 
likelihood of voluntary compliance is the perceived legitimacy of law enforcement. The 
belief that an officer has the proper authority to issue an order, and expect compliance, 
can be affected by many different factors. The police organization that a patrol officer 
belongs to may increase or decrease his or her legitimacy in the mind of a given citizen. 
An agency that has developed a reputation for corruption may undercut the authority that 
citizens ascribe to officers. By the same token, an officer who obviously appears to be a 
rookie may be treated as though she/he has less of a right to demand compliance. It 
should be noted that a “recent study suggests that legitimacy may be a powerful element 
in securing compliance” (Mastrofski et al. 1996:277).  
The general legitimacy of a police officer or law enforcement agency may affect 
the likelihood of compliance; however, the view that an officer has the right to expect 
compliance can vary with the type of command and the situational setting in which it is 
issued. Humans are sensitive to the ways in which social rules shift from one physical 
location to another. In the case of policing, noncompliance is more or less proper 
depending on location. “Police actions have greater legitimacy to the extent that they are 
seen to take place in domains where police authority is greatest: public places and police 
facilities” (Mastrofski et al. 1996:277).  
The legitimacy of an officer also is dependent on an officer’s behavior during the 
interaction. If an officer is fair in his/her dealings with a citizen, legitimacy increases. 
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“The relational model of authority suggests that people evaluate group authorities in 
terms of fairness of the manner in which they exercise their authority: that is, via 
procedural justice” (Sunshine and Tyler 2003:154). Sunshine and Tyler (2003:163) make 
the observation that increasing legitimacy and increasing moral solidarity both function 
to make “people feel that they ought to comply and cooperate with the police.” They also 
note that when officers follow procedures perceived as being fair, legitimacy and moral 
solidarity are both strengthened (Sunshine and Tyler 2003). In this way, the effect of 
fairness upon citizen compliance is demonstrated to be a combination of legitimacy and 
attachment. 
Similar to the effect fairness has upon citizens’ likelihood of compliance, the level 
of respect with which officers treat citizens is a variable which also is assumed to affect 
voluntary compliance. When officers treat citizens with respect or civility, it creates “a 
greater likelihood of (the civility) being reciprocated by citizens” (Mastrofski et al. 
1996:277). The effect of respect is quite commonsensical and plays out in everyday 
interactions in much the same way as within officer/citizen compliance interactions. 
However, what is interesting is the degree to which a law enforcement officer’s status 
enables him/her to elicit respect from citizens “even when police were uncivil toward 
them” (Mastrofski et al. 1996:277). Closely related to the factor of respect, is the use of 
threats. Issuing threats is an obtuse and disrespectful form of communication, and thus 
decreases the likelihood of citizen compliance.  
 Thus, the normative variable of legitimacy also is affected by the characteristics 
of the officers involved in compliance seeking. Research on officers “shows that traits 
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such as race, sex, education, and attitudes have little influence on behavior and 
performance” (Mastrofski et al. 1996:280). However, the difference between skill levels 
and experience are important. Police officers themselves often note the “value of 
experience, of seeing the same thing reoccur” (Muir 1977:59). As police officers mature 
in their profession, they learn to pick up on particular cues. Muir (1977:153) states that 
“to anticipate what was going to happen, policemen developed a sense for the patterns in 
human affairs.” Terrill and Mastrofski (2002) conducted a study that found that, on 
average, less force was used by experienced officers. This may indicate that more 
experienced officers are perceived to have a greater legitimate expectation of voluntary 
compliance than their less senior co-workers.  
 In addition to the personal characteristics and experience of a given law 
enforcement officer, it is widely held that police departments can have an influence upon 
the legitimacy which is ascribed to their officers by the public. The community-policing 
model of law enforcement is designed to allow for more incorporation of patrol officers 
into the communities that they police. “Community policing emphasizes alternatives to 
formal sanctions when they are likely to be more effective or efficient in solving 
problems” (Mastrofski et al. 1996:280). This perspective theoretically encourages 
individual officers to work towards obtaining voluntary compliance from citizens. 
“Community policing means making the police more cooperative with those who are not 
police” (Mastrofski, Worden and Snipes 1995:540). The degree to which a given officer 
is affected by these policies may be influenced by how much importance the department 
places on this model, the particular approach that the department takes, and the degree to 
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which the particular patrol officer identifies with the community policing ideology. Such 
a policing model cannot only affect the department’s reputation in the community but 
also the way an individual officer deals with citizens, thereby increasing his/her 
legitimacy in the eyes of citizens. 
 Normative variables are those which, according to social interactionism, influence 
behavior due to an individual’s investment in society. However, SI describes a second 
group of variables that affect behavior on a much more situational level. Instrumental 
variables are defined as the tendency to conform in order to avoid adverse consequences. 
In the case of interactions with police officers, these adverse consequences can be 
represented by “formal sanctions (arrest, conviction, and court-imposed punishment) or 
informal sanctions (shaming or the disapproval of those who matter)” (Mastrofski et al. 
1996:273). 
 It almost goes without saying that an individual’s capacity for rational judgment 
has an effect on his/her likelihood of making decisions rationally, and the social 
interactionist perspective makes allowance for this factor. Officers often have 
encountered that “when people are intoxicated, deranged, hysterical, or enraged, they 
become particularly difficult to manage” (Mastrofski et al. 1996:274). Many factors can 
inhibit the degree of rationality with which an individual makes decisions. Those who 
suffer from certain developmental/communication disorders, such as Down Syndrome 
and autism, can lack the ability to perceive and make appropriate inferences based on 
information presented to them. Thus, their ability to make rational decisions is lessened.  
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This diminishment also is experienced by those suffering from a variety of mental 
disorders. For example, an individual suffering from schizophrenia may be subject to 
auditory or visual hallucinations, and when an individual with this malady makes 
decisions, he/she cannot be considered rational due to the fact that imagined data are 
influencing decision-making. Also, individuals can ingest a variety of substances that 
impair their decision-making processes. These include alcohol, legal medications and 
illegal drugs. Finally, emotionality tends to decrease capacity for rational choice. Just as 
decision-making abilities in mathematics would be disrupted if an individual were not 
calm, the capacity for rational decisions concerning compliance also is influenced by 
emotion.  
 One instrumental variable that may affect decision-making processes of 
compliance is the perceived seriousness of the problem that attracts the officer’s 
attention. In police-citizen situations, “the severity of the punishment is largely a matter 
of the seriousness of the offense” (Mastrofski et al. 1996:274). The crime under 
investigation and the strength of the evidence linking a citizen to that crime are directly 
linked to a citizen’s possibility of punishment. Therefore, compliance, which assists the 
investigation, becomes a matter of either mitigating the possible punishment or using 
noncompliance to thwart the investigation and thereby avoid punishment completely. 
 The levels of authoritativeness of an officer also is linked to the likelihood of 
obtaining voluntary compliance in the social interactionist perspective. Officers can 
influence the compliance of citizens through the use of coercion. “What makes coercion 
work is imparting to the target the impression that the officer can and will deliver on the 
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threat, implied or explicit” (Mastrofski et al. 1996:274). The authoritativeness that an 
officer presents when he or she enters an interaction, and the levels of authoritativeness 
that are used when framing commands, can be either highly or moderately coercive. Also, 
failing to comply with the lawful command of an officer is a crime for which an 
individual can be arrested. Thus, a certain level of coercion is present in any 
officer/citizen interaction.  
Instrumental variables which can affect the likelihood of compliance are not 
limited to formal sanctions, like arrest. Officers often use formal sanctions as a last resort 
and instead utilize “informal strategies, and shaming strategies in particular, that are the 
currency of discipline in everyday life” (Rock 1995:23). According to the SI approach, 
citizens in compliance interactions consider more than the likelihood of arrest or injury. 
Individuals also take into account public humiliation and even the disappointment of the 
officer on the scene. Behavior is often guided by these more subtle, yet important, forces 
of embarrassment and shame. These are powerful factors in determining behavior when 
receiving commands from law enforcement.  
The social interactionist perspective provides a method of understanding 
compliance interactions that is deep and rich. SI looks at the way a variety of normative 
and instrumental factors influence the decision maker in the interaction. According to 
social interactionism, actors can perform rational calculations of cost and benefit while at 
the same time their behavior is unconsciously influenced by his/her own investment in 
society and its social norms. This perspective predicts a diversity of influences on 
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voluntary compliance behavior and is therefore a useful tool for examining the 
complicated event of an officer/citizen compliance interaction.  
Judgmental Heuristics 
The concept that human beings consciously decide on courses of compliance or 
noncompliance, in a more or less rational way, weighing the factors involved, is not a 
universally held view. Robert B. Cialdini (2001) suggests that decision-making processes 
are often aided or even replaced by cognitive shortcuts known as judgmental heuristics. 
Complex situations or a course of events which deprive a decision maker of the time or 
distance necessary for rational judgment tend to necessitate judgmental heuristics. 
Cialdini (2001:7) states that “we must very often use our stereotypes, our rules of thumb, 
to classify things according to a few key features and then to respond without thinking 
when one or another of these trigger features is present.” This phenomenon is especially 
applicable to the study of compliance.  
Any society has an interest in insuring the obedience of its members, which is 
obvious in the conditioning that takes place both in parent-child relationships as well as 
teacher-child dynamics. Without a system of obedience to authority, no society would be 
able to function. These heuristics are communicated and enforced through social norms, 
which “are rules and standards that are understood by members of a group, and that guide 
and/or constrain social behavior without the force of laws” (Cialdini and Trost 1998:152). 
The result of this necessary system of compliance is that “our obedience frequently takes 
place . . . with little or no conscious deliberation” (Cialdini 2001:185). In other words, if 
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an individual is identified as an authority figure, a greater likelihood exists that he/she 
will receive compliance from those around him/her. 
Cialdini (2001) also points to some specific factors that function as triggers for 
compliance judgmental heuristics that are present in patrol officer-citizen encounters. 
According to Cialdini, individuals tend to acquiesce to the requests of a person who is 
perceived as having a higher social status or a position of authority. Those who hold 
positions of authority “whether they have acquired their positions through knowledge, 
talent, or power” (Cialdini and Trost 1998:170) exert a great deal of influence over those 
they contact. As it relates to officer/citizen interactions, the fact that an officer holds the 
title of police officer makes compliance much more likely. A variety of psychological 
experiments have discovered a “mechanical deference given to individuals whose titles 
bespeak authority” (Cialdini 2001:192) and a discrimination against those who possess 
titles which indicate a lack of authority. So too does the uniform of a law enforcement 
officer add to his or her likelihood of obtaining compliance.  
Reciprocation is the tendency of an individual to attempt to “repay in kind, what 
another person has provided” him or her (Cialdini 2001:20). The assumption that others 
will pay us back in kind for services rendered to them is a bedrock of social interactions. 
The assumption of equitable dealings allows for exchanges of services, despite the fact 
that there is usually a necessary delay of payment to one of the parties. This judgmental 
heuristic “helps us build trust with others and pushes us toward equity in our 
relationships” (Cialdini and Goldstein 2004:599). Compliance to a request is a prime 
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example of this kind of repayment. To the extent that one feels indebted to another, 
he/she will be more likely to acquiesce to a request made by that person.  
The judgmental heuristic of consistency is the tendency of an individual to 
maintain equivalence with his/her own previous behavior or expressed views. This 
mental shortcut pushes us towards decisions which are in line with the way we have 
presented ourselves in the past. The theory of judgmental heuristics views “the desire for 
consistency as a prime motivator of our behavior” (Cialdini and Trost 1998:177) which 
includes the behavior of compliance. For example, if an individual presents him/herself 
as being obedient and law abiding, he/she will be much more likely to act in a manner 
consistent with this characterization, which in the case of compliance interactions with a 
police officer would include complying with verbal commands. 
Social proof is the tendency of an individual to “view a behavior as correct in a 
given situation to the degree that” (Cialdini, 2001:100) the individual observes the 
behavior being exhibited by those around him or her. Another term for this type of 
behavior is conformity. The actions of others act as clues which allow us “to gain an 
accurate understanding of and effectively respond to social situations, especially during 
times of uncertainty” (Cialdini and Goldstein 2004:597). In officer/citizen compliance 
interactions, social proof comes into play as citizens take note of the behavior of those 
around them in relation to the commands of an officer. If the citizen is unsure of the 
situation, this heuristic may be much more likely to influence compliance or 
noncompliance. 
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Liking is the tendency of an individual to acquiesce to the requests of persons 
toward whom they have positive feelings. It is fairly intuitive that “people are more 
favorably inclined towards the needs of those they know and like” (Cialdini and Trost 
1998:174). This judgmental heuristic grows out of the compulsion towards reciprocation. 
We want those whom we like to like us, and we feel the need to like those whom we 
know like us. When an individual seeks compliance from us, and we have positive 
feelings towards him/her, we are more likely to acquiesce due to the fact that we hope to 
influence a reciprocation of our affection in the compliance seeker. For those attempting 
to gain compliance from others, strategies to engage the judgmental heuristic of liking 
include complimenting the targeted individual and attempting “to be perceived as 
cooperating partners with a target person” (Cialdini and Trost 1998:175).  
Additionally, other factors increase the likelihood of liking, and thus compliance. 
The physical attractiveness of an individual increases their likeability, so too do 
similarities that exist between interaction participants. We are more likely to have 
positive feelings towards attractive people and those who are similar to ourselves and 
thus are more likely to comply with their commands/requests. 
  Caildini (2001) proposes that individuals view items and opportunities as more 
coveted when they are scarce. In other words, “opportunities seem more valuable to us 
when they are less available” (Cialdini and Trost 1998:172). Thus, presenting an 
opportunity as being obtainable for a limited period of time can create a situation in 
which those targeted will be more likely to attempt to take advantage of said opportunity. 
This can become a compliance heuristic when a situation arises, for example, when 
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officers attempt to elicit confessions and present the gains of confessing as being of value 
for a limited time. This interaction frames the act of confessing as being the cost of a 
temporally scarce resource, and thus the suspect is more likely to comply with the 
officer’s request.  
 The theory of judgmental heuristics describes a method of decision making 
regarding compliance to commands. According to this theory, an individual’s decision to 
comply with an order is less a reasoning process than it is a reflexive cognitive reaction to 
one of a series of triggers. Theorists of judgmental heuristics suggest that these cognitive 
reactions function as mental shortcuts which abet quick and decisive decision making. As 
has been discussed, judgmental heuristics encompasses a variety of these compliance 
triggers. The processes of the cognitive reflex that is described by the theory of 
judgmental heuristics cannot be easily assessed. However, it is possible to investigate 
whether or not compliance is more likely in the presence of the triggers suggested by 
judgmental heuristics.  
I have chosen these two theories in part because they are compatible with my data 
source. For example, theories requiring an understanding of the cognitions or beliefs of 
actors would not be observable from the video footage of interactions used here. I also 
choose these theories because they help to reveal the micro- level factors that can 
influence citizen voluntary compliance to police officer commands. Before examining the 
literature on compliance interactions, it is important to note how these two theoretical 
perspectives will be used to guide this research.   
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The task of studying the phenomena of voluntary compliance “requires intensive 
and extensive familiarity with the empirical area to which the problem refers” (Blumer 
1969:128). The perspectives of social interactionism and judgmental heuristics have 
provided a series of variables which may influence the likelihood of citizen voluntary 
compliance during officer/citizen compliance interactions. For the purposes of this 
research, I take the view that “social theory is primarily an interpretation (of the empirical 
world) which orders the world into its mold, not a studious cultivation of empirical facts 
to see if the theory fits” (Blumer 1969:141). I see these two theories as lenses which 
direct my observations of an extremely complicated phenomenon. The complexity of 
officer/citizen interactions necessitates a study which limits the number of variables to be 
investigated. These two theoretical perspectives provide just such a framing of the data in 
this research.  
I did not engage in theory testing as a part of this research. Rather than testing the 
comparative validity of either social interactionism or judgmental heuristics, I used them 
to guide my search for factors that affect the phenomenon of voluntary compliance. In 
choosing these two perspectives, I made the decision to restrict my focus to a certain field 
of variables. This necessitated neglecting an array of other factors suggested by other 
theories which might affect citizen voluntary compliance. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
 
 The practices of law enforcement officers are of great interest to Sociologists and 
Criminologists alike, reflected in the abundance of research on the topic. Additionally, 
power and obedience are two concepts which have been studied extensively in Sociology 
as well as Social Psychology. However, there is a dearth of research concerning 
officer/citizen compliance interactions. The state of the literature on this topic is at first 
surprising, considering the levels of scientific interest concerning both obedience and 
officer/citizen relations more generally. Yet, the lack of investigation into this topic may 
be more readily understood when considering the difficulties surrounding the availability 
of data for this type of research. It is difficult to gain the permission of law enforcement 
agencies to conduct systematic observations of officer/citizen interactions, and such 
research can entail certain dangers to researchers.  
As will be discussed at length later on, the unique status that police officers hold 
in our society—a position of high social status along with the legitimate authority to use 
force and effect arrest—necessitates study of the actual encounters of officers and 
citizens to understand what factors affect voluntary compliance in these situations. Other 
studies of compliance may give us applicable results, but all information derived from 
interactions not involving police officers are of questionable applicability due to the 
unique nature of the role of law enforcement officers. 
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Exploration of Research into Social Interactionism 
 The most focused examination of police/citizen compliance interactions to date is 
provided by Mastrofski et al. (1996) in “Compliance on Demand.” Mastrofski et al. 
(1996) conducted field research in 1992 through ride-alongs with the Richmond Police 
Department located in Richmond, Virginia. Ride-alongs involve the researcher 
accompanying a patrol officer in the police cruiser as they conduct routine patrol and 
respond to calls for service. The field researchers observed a total of 346 exchanges 
involving an officer requesting compliance from a citizen. They coded these interactions 
as resulting in noncompliance or compliance. Noncompliance included when citizens 
refused to comply or gave no indication of their intent regarding compliance, and 
compliance included when citizens promised to comply or complied with an officer’s 
command in the presence of the researcher. “When different requests were made, citizens 
were considered noncompliant if they failed to comply with any of them before an arrest 
was made or the encounter was otherwise terminated” (Mastofski et al. 1996:281). The 
focal point of this research was the “ultimate outcome” (Mastofski et al. 1996:283) of the 
compliance interaction in terms of citizen obedience or disobedience to officer 
commands.  
 Mastrofski et al. (1996) did not draw the same distinction between voluntary and 
non-voluntary compliance as I do in this research. They distinguished simply between 
compliance and noncompliance without much inference as to whether the ultimate 
compliance was voluntary or involuntary. However, I assume that once physical force is 
used by an officer upon a citizen, the entire nature of the interaction changes. Obedience 
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obtained through force is qualitatively different from compliance obtained by all means 
short of violence. For this reason, my study differs from Mastrofski et al. (1996) by 
defining all interactions in which officers use physical force, to include the brandishing of 
a weapon, as interactions resulting in noncompliance. Though an understanding of 
compliance following violence may be interesting, and even useful, especially to those 
engaged in controlling prisoners, it is outside the purview of this research.  
 Mastrofski et al. (1996:281) “prepared a detailed narrative account of events and 
coded key items associated with those events according to a protocol.” The variables to 
be coded were developed based on the social interactionist perspective. These included 
normative and instrumental factors that might affect the probability of an officer 
obtaining compliance from an individual.  
The normative factors which were recorded by the researchers included: the levels 
of respect the officer granted the citizen, the manor of initiation of the interaction, the 
officer’s use of threats, the strength of the evidence against the citizen, the relative public 
or private location of the interaction, whether or not the officer had prior knowledge of 
the citizen, and a variety of demographic factors of both the officer and citizen involved. 
The demographics measured also included rough estimates of the economic status of the 
citizen. Additionally, the way in which the interaction was initiated was recorded. 
Finally, the field researchers conducted interviews with the officers whom they were 
observing in order to assess the officer’s years of experience, which served as a proxy for 
the level of professional skill possessed by an officer. Also in the interviews researchers 
asked about the officers’ commitment to the concept of community-oriented policing, 
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allowing a determination of how the attitudes of officers about this method of law 
enforcement might influence an officer’s likelihood of obtaining compliance. 
Mastrofski et al. (1996) discovered that citizens were more likely to comply with 
officer commands if the strength of evidence against them was high. Also, citizens were 
more likely to comply with officer commands if the location of the exchange was more 
public as opposed to on the private property of the citizen. Citizens also were more likely 
to comply with commands from officers who had more years of experience as well as 
those from officers who were more committed to community-oriented policing. The 
research also revealed that males and minorities, often considered groups more likely to 
rebel against authority, “are more likely to show compliance” (Mastrofski et al. 
1996:289). Also, minority citizens were more likely to comply with the commands of a 
white officer. 
However, several normative factors decreased the likelihood of citizen 
compliance to officer commands. If an officer showed disrespect to a citizen or issued a 
threat towards a citizen, that citizen was less likely to comply with officer commands. If 
the police officer demonstrated that he/she had some prior knowledge of the citizen, or if 
the officer initiated the interaction, the citizen was less likely to comply with officer 
commands. Mastrofski et al. (1996) discovered that citizens who appeared to be poor 
were less likely to comply with officer commands and that white citizens were less likely 
to comply with the commands of a minority officer. Mastrofski et al. (1996) also 
investigated the effect of how the police were first called to the interaction; however, the 
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results did not show that this variable either increased or decreased a citizen’s likelihood 
of compliance. 
Exploration also was made of the effect of several instrumental factors. These 
included: the number of citizens present, the seriousness of the problem under 
investigation by the police, the number of officers present at the scene of the interaction, 
the levels of authoritativeness used by officers on first contact with the citizen, and the 
degree of irrationality of the citizen. Additionally, they examined the impact of citizens’ 
possession of a weapon and the authoritativeness with which individual commands were 
communicated by police 
 Mastrofski et al. (1996) did not find any instrumental factors that significantly 
increased citizen compliance. However, they did discover that citizens were less likely to 
comply with officer commands if the crime/problem under investigation was serious. 
Similarly, citizens were less likely to comply with officer commands if they were less 
rational due to intoxication, mental defect, or emotion. Mastrofski et al. (1996) also found 
that citizens were less likely to be compliant if the officer used force upon first 
encountering the citizen. These findings reinforce my decision to define interactions 
where force is used as non-compliance interactions. Following the application of force by 
officers, citizen compliance is rare, and when citizens do obey officer commands, the 
behavior is a type of compliance which is qualitatively distinct from voluntary 
compliance.  
 Mastrofski et al. (1996) also discovered several instrumental variables which had 
no effect upon a citizen’s likelihood of compliance. Neither the number of officers nor 
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the number of citizens present increased or decreased a citizen’s likelihood of 
compliance. Citizens who were armed were just as likely to comply with officer 
commands as those who were unarmed. Also, the authority with which an officer gave 
his/her commands did not appear to affect that citizen’s likelihood of complying. 
Exploration of Research into Judgmental Heuristics 
The literature concerning judgmental heuristics does not include direct study of 
officer/citizen interactions. Instead, research has examined variables that act as triggers of 
judgmental heuristics, thereby influencing or persuading compliance to requests and 
commands. Robert B. Cialdini, in his 2001 work “Influence: Science and Practice,” 
reviews a wide variety of social-psychological experiments and studies that explore the 
nature of compliance and obedience as well as the more subtle form of compliance 
known as conformity. Cialdini (2001) cites a social-psychological experiment which 
examines the effect of a uniform on likelihood of compliance. The researchers found a 
striking difference in the likelihood of obedience when the independent variable of 
uniform dress was considered. “Nearly all of the pedestrians complied with his [the 
confederate’s] directive when he wore the guard costume, but fewer than half did so 
when he was dressed normally” (Cialdini 2001:194). These findings suggest that a key to 
understanding voluntary compliance in citizen-officer encounters may rest on an 
examination of such unlikely influences as the uniform and title of the particular officer 
on the scene. 
In a series of experiments conducted by Leonard Bickman in the 1970’s (as cited 
in Cialdini 2001), researchers investigated the power of authority, as indicated by the 
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presence of a uniform, to influence compliance. The experimenters had an assistant stand 
by a car which was parked next to a parking meter. A second assistant, the requester, who 
was located approximately 50 feet away on a sidewalk would approach pedestrians and 
give them a command. In half of the cases, the requester would be dressed in normal 
fashion. However, in the other half, he would be dressed in the uniform of a security 
guard. “The requester, whether dressed normally or as a security guard, always said the 
same thing to the pedestrian, ‘You see that guy over there by the meter? He’s overparked 
but doesn’t have any change. Give him a dime!’ The requester then turned a corner and 
walked away” (Cialdini 2001:193-194). At that point, the pedestrian under observation 
either complied or failed to comply with the command of the now absent requester. The 
study revealed that 92% of the pedestrians complied with the command of the uniformed 
requester as opposed to a 42% compliance rate when the requester was dressed in a 
normal fashion (Cialdini 2001). 
An experiment conducted by Dennis Regan evaluated the influence of 
“reciprocation” on compliance. Participants were placed in a situation with an actor who 
pretended to be a fellow participant in the study. The actor would go out of the room and 
return with either one or two bottles of Coca-Cola. In those cases where the confederate 
returned with two cokes, he would offer one to the participant. In both designs, the actor 
would proceed to attempt to sell the participant raffle tickets. The researchers found that 
the participants who had been offered the soft drink “bought twice as many tickets as the 
subjects who had not been given a prior favor” (Cialdini 2001:22). 
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Researchers also have investigated the judgmental heuristic of “consistency.” This 
heuristic theorizes that individuals will work to act in a manner which is consistent with 
previously expressed views or behaviors. One way that this cognitive shortcut is triggered 
is through the use of the Foot-In-The-Door (FITD) technique. “The procedure involves 
first asking a target individual to comply with a small request, typically one that is 
minimally invasive so that the target is almost certain to respond affirmatively. After 
securing compliance, either the initial requester or an associate of the requester makes a 
larger, often related request” (Cialdini and Goldstein 2004:602). In a study conducted by 
Jonathan Freedman and Scott Fraser, the effectiveness of the FITD technique was 
demonstrated. Researchers would go to residences and request the homeowner to consent 
to a large public service sign, which read “DRIVE CAREFULLY,” being placed on their 
property. The compliance rate, in this phase of the experiment, was 17%. However, if 
homeowners had agreed to sign a petition “that favored ‘keeping California beautiful’” 
(Cialdini 2001:66), they were much more likely to comply with the request for the 
placement of the sign when researchers approached them two weeks later. In fact almost 
half of those who expressed support for the petition agreed to the placement of the sign. 
In the famous experiments conducted by Solomon Asch on “social proof” and 
“conformity,” the researchers used a diagram showing four vertical lines. The first line 
was labeled “X” and the next three lines were labeled A, B and C. Line X was the same 
length as line B with A being slightly, but noticeably, longer and line C being slightly 
shorter than lines B and X. A participant would be in a room with four other individuals 
who were posing as participants but who were really confederates of the researchers. A 
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researcher presented the diagram to the 5 individuals and asked them to choose which 
line—A, B or C—was the same length as line X. The confederates responded one at a 
time that they each believed line A to be the same length as line X, even though it was 
noticeably longer than line X. The researchers discovered that “approximately three-
quarters of the subjects conformed at least once by responding incorrectly” (Aronson 
1954:21). 
The judgmental heuristic of “liking” and its effect on compliance has been studied 
along with the factors which increase the likelihood of compliance. One study showed 
that “in a fund-raising context, one study found that attractive solicitors for the American 
Heart Association generated nearly twice as much compliance (42 versus 23 percent) 
than did unattractive solicitors” (Cialdini and Trost 1998:174-175). Similar results were 
discovered when those who seek compliance are similar to those from whom the 
command is coming. “One researcher who examined the sales records of insurance 
companies found that customers were more likely to buy insurance when a salesperson 
was like them in age, religion, politics, and cigarette-smoking habits” (Cialdini 
2001:151). Additionally, those who gave compliments to those from whom they were 
trying to elicit behavior were more likely to gain compliance. A study done by Jones and 
Wortman on the effect of flattery on an individual’s perception of the flatterer revealed 
that “compliments produced just as much liking for the flatterer when they were untrue as 
when they were true” (Cialdini and Trost 1998:175). 
The final judgmental heuristic that has been researched is that of “scarcity.” 
Researchers have demonstrated that individuals are more likely to desire something that 
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is scarce. Thus, if a desired behavior is presented as necessary to obtain something of 
limited supply, compliance will be more likely. A study by Heilman in the 1970’s 
revealed “supermarket shoppers were most likely to agree to sign a petition favoring 
federal price controls when the requester incited reactance by informing them that a 
federal official had opposed the distribution of the petition” (Cialdini and Trost 
1998:173). 
In addition to the research into social interactionism and judgmental heuristics, it 
is important to discuss research into the phenomena of dominance. Dominance is a term 
that is used within social psychology to express the ways that individual expresses 
physical or social superiority ove r another individual.  
Obviously, officer/citizen compliance interactions are conducted in the midst of a 
social context marked by an unequal power relationship. The social role of a law 
enforcement officer has, as previously noted, authoritative superiority and physical 
dominance over the role of a citizen. Social situations where such substantial inequalities 
exist have been subjected to study by social scientists. Possibly, the most famous 
experiment into the affect of such unequal social situations is the Stanford Prison 
Experiment, conducted in 1971 by a team of psychologists led by Philip Zimbardo 
(Haney, Banks and Zimbardo 1973). 
This experiment divided student volunteers into two randomly assigned groups, 
one being given the role of prison guards and the second being given the role of prisoners 
(Haney et al. 1973). The members of the second group were placed in a prison- like 
environment while the first group was divided into shifts and instructed to act as guards 
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of the prisoners (Haney et al. 1973). The experiment created a social environment with 
two roles of unequal power. The researchers found that, when placed in these roles, 
“prisoners immediately adopted a generally passive response mode while guards adopted 
a very active initiative role in all interactions” (Haney et al. 1973:79).  
This research did not deal specifically with the issue of compliance, but instead 
focused on the degree to which individuals adopt prescribed roles and the psychologically 
caustic effects of the prison environment upon guards and prisoners alike. The 
researchers observed “extremely pathological reactions that emerged in both groups of 
subjects” (Haney et al. 1973:80) with some guards becoming aggressive and sadistic, 
while some prisoners became withdrawn and depressed. These results forced the 
researchers to terminate the experiment after only six days, although it had been 
scheduled to last for two weeks (Haney et al. 1973). This study found that “throughout 
the experiment commands were the most frequent form of verbal behavior” (Haney et al. 
1973:80). Generally, the study found the prisoners to be compliant with the commands of 
the guards, with only 32 incidents of physical resistance observed, this despite an 
escalation in the amount of harassment the guards demonstrated towards the prisoners 
(Haney et al. 1973). It also was noted that as the experiment progressed, the prisoners 
“responded more passively to the acts of others” (Haney et al. 1973:84).  
This study did not focus on the interpersonal interactions in which guards 
attempted to gain compliance from citizens. But, the Stanford Prison Experiment does 
provide a useful example of the extent to which individuals in a social setting of unequal 
power tend to enact dominance or submission as prescribed by the relative power of their 
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role. It also is important to note that the social context, and the roles themselves, tend to 
affect the behavior of the individuals to a greater extent than the backgrounds or character 
of the particular participant. 
The current study is guided by these previous investigations into the phenomenon 
of compliance. The work of Mastofski et al. (1996) in particular has influenced not only 
the view adopted here as to the nature of compliance interactions, but has provided 
specific tools for assessing officer/citizen interactions. However, this research is unique 
in that it uses the theories of both social interactionism and judgmental heuristics in order 
to gain a deeper understanding of officer/citizen interaction. Additionally, cruiser 
mounted video system footage has not been previously used as a data source for this type 
of research.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
Research Questions  
The goal of this research is to ascertain factors that influence the likelihood of 
citizen voluntary compliance to the verbal commands of a law enforcement officer during 
an encounter. Thus, the research is guided by the following questions: 
 1. What traits and/or behaviors, if any, on the part of the primary citizen affect, 
positively or negatively, the likelihood of his/her voluntary compliance with officer 
commands? 
 2. What traits and/or behaviors, if any, on the part of the primary officer affect, 
positively or negatively, the likelihood of the primary citizen voluntarily complying with 
officer commands? 
 3. What, if any, situational factors affect a citizen’s likelihood of voluntary 
compliance to officer commands during a compliance interaction?  
 4. Does the presence, absence, or behavior of secondary officers and/or citizens 
affect, positively or negatively, the likelihood of the primary citizen voluntarily 
complying with officer commands? 
Data Collection 
 The literature surrounding the study of officer/citizen interactions primarily 
focuses on participant observations using the method of patrol ride-alongs. The most 
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relevant piece of sociological research into voluntary compliance was conducted by 
Mastrofski et al. in “Compliance on Demand: The Public’s Response to Specific Police 
Requests” (1996). The research methods for this piece included the ethnographic 
techniques of accompanying patrol officers of the Richmond Police Department as they 
conducted the work of their shift. The researchers not only recorded their observations of 
the actual officer/citizen encounters, but also conducted detailed interviews with the 
officers involved. “Observers later prepared a detailed narrative account of events and 
coded key items associated with those events according to a protocol available on 
computers at the research office” (Mastrofski et al. 1996: 280). 
  The dedicated fieldwork conducted by the Mastrofski et al. (1996) research team 
broadened the understanding of compliance interactions. The benefits of the use of such 
indepth qualitative research are advocated by many sociologists as well as scientists from 
other fields. Rather than forcing social interactions into the method advocated by 
positivistic scientific method, “the naturalist resists schemes or models which over-
simplify the complexity of everyday life” (Denzin 1971:168). The byzantine nature of a 
police/citizen compliance interaction calls for an approach that allows the researcher to 
examine all of the factors that influence the exchanges and their outcomes. “The value of 
ethnography as a social research method is founded upon the existence of such variations 
in cultural patterns across and within societies and their significance for understanding 
social processes” (Hammersley and Atkinson 1995:9).  
 Yet, the methods of the Matrofski et al. (1996) research team are not easily 
replicated. They require a large number of researcher hours to accumulate an adequate 
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number of police/citizen interactions. Furthermore, the participant/observer approach can 
fall prey to the critique that the observers necessarily influence the processes that they are 
attempting to observe (Hammersley and Atkinson 1995). This is especially relevant in a 
study of police/citizen compliance interactions due to the fact that police officers are 
necessarily mindful of the presence of a ride-along participant who is not only recording 
their behavior but whose safety is the responsibility of the given patrol officer. Also, the 
litigious environment of modern America can make institutions weary of any outside 
oversight. In addition, ethnographic methods of research always are limited by the 
individual researcher’s ability to observe and record the interactions they have been 
witness to. This is especially true in the sometimes chaotic and dangerous processes of a 
police/citizen compliance interaction, where concerns of safety make calm concentration 
difficult. 
 However, a middle ground exists between the artificial but controlled setting of 
positivist social experiments and the authentic yet sometimes chaotic scene of a 
naturalistic ethnographic field study; that is a content analysis of unedited footage of 
interactions recorded in natural settings. Several sociologists have noted the ubiquity of 
methods of surveillance in our society (Staples 2000). They tend to see the dispersion of 
such devices of observation as part of the Foucaultian concept of the Panopticon, which 
allows societal power to be wielded over individuals through self-governance, which is 
created by omnipresent surveillance. Staples (2000:154) gives the example that “while 
police officers can surveil suspects with a new high tech scanner, the department can 
‘keep an eye’ on the very officer by installing a videocam in the patrol car.” 
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While the use of cruiser-mounted video cameras may represent the move towards 
a surveillance society, I view the use of in-car video systems mounted in police cruisers 
(usually on or above the dashboards of the cars, hence the term “dash cams”) as a 
technology that can supply social researchers with a new source of data. The dash cam 
video databases of law enforcement agencies provide researchers with unedited visual 
and auditory records of police/citizen exchanges. This opportunity provides for 
examination of interactions, while at the same time eliminating the possibility of the 
researcher actually influencing the actions of the participants. 
 Law enforcement agencies are usually resistant to the intrusion of social 
scientists, but access to the dash cam footage databases from the King Police Department 
and the Kernersville Police Department, two small police departments in the Piedmont 
region of North Carolina, was granted. The selection of these agencies for research was a 
result of geographic convenience, willingness of the agencies, and the presence of video 
databases. I must stress that I do not make any claims to the demographic 
representativeness of the cities of King or Kernersville nor, obviously, can I make the 
statement that these communities are geographically representative of either North 
Carolina much less the United States as a whole. These two communities are both 
relatively small, with the city of King having a population of approximately 6400, and the 
city of Kernersville, NC, having a population of approximately 19,000. However, 
communities of the size used in this research are far more common throughout the United 
States, than are cities the size of Richmond, VA (population of over 197,000) which was 
used by the Mastrofski et al. (1996) study.  
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 Though the advantages of this data source are myriad, it also has its limitations. 
By using dash cam footage, the researcher has limited view of the actual police/citizen 
interaction. The camera only captures a certain field of vision, and the audio which is 
recorded using portable microphones positioned on the lapels of the particular patrol 
officer catches only a certain amount of the dialog or surrounding sound. Further, it is 
possible that the presence of the in-car video system alters the behaviors of the officers 
involved, making them more considerate of their behavior due to the presence of 
surveillance.  
It is possible that a difference may exist between officer behavior in interactions 
with citizens where officers know that they are being filmed and those which occur 
outside the view of surveillance. However, dash cam systems are in all patrol cars of the 
two police departments involved, and their use is mandated by policy. Further, the use of 
these cruiser mounted video systems is very common and becoming universal to 
American police departments. Therefore, while the applicability of the findings may be 
limited to patrol officers using dash cam systems, this use is so widespread that there will 
be widespread applicability.  
 For this analysis, I conducted a content analysis of the video databases of 
Kernersville Police Department and King Police Department. The primary data source for 
this study is  the video database of the Kernersville PD, which records in a digital format 
stored on a server inside the department’s headquarters. The footage is viewed using a 
Windows based media player. The Kernersville PD video database contains 
approximately 1,720 separate video files of various lengths. The video files of the 
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Kernersville PD are separated into 14 different groups according to the type of police 
activity involved. The Kernersville PD footage database contains significantly more 
footage than that of the database of King PD. Additionally, at the time that I was 
conducting this study, King Police Department was in the process of transferring its 
cruiser mounted video system from VHS and 8mm film to a digital system. Due to these 
factors, I thought it necessary to use the Kernersville PD database as my primary data 
source. I take a much larger sample from the Kernersville PD database and use only these 
interactions to assess my research questions, rather than combining interactions sampled 
from the databases of both departments. However, I also conducted a much smaller scale 
study of the King Police Department video database. Including a smaller sample from 
King PD allows me to investigate the effect of the independent variable of departmental 
differences on voluntary compliance. 
It is not possible to determine the population of all officer/citizen compliance 
interactions involving officers of the Kernersville Police Department, much less those 
concerning law enforcement officers within the United States. All face-to-face 
interactions that an on-duty police officer has with a civilian in which the citizen is given 
some kind of verbal command meet the definition of a compliance interaction. However, 
these events occur in a variety of places and times, some more formal and some less 
formal, and most are not caught on videotape. Thus, it is not possible to determine the 
number of these officer/citizen compliance interactions, nor is it feasible to organize a 
representative sample of them. Instead, I limited my population to the video databases of 
the police departments under study.  
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 With regard to the Kernersville database, the number of days that a video file is 
stored is determined by the way in which the individual officers identify the interaction 
when it is saved to the server. For example, a video file which is saved in the folder for 
“driving while intoxicated” is not erased from the system for 365 days, as compared to 
the video files within the “speeding” folder, which are deleted 30 days after being 
downloaded into the server. The only exception to this policy is when footage is needed 
for court proceedings or internal affairs investigations, in which case the video file is 
copied onto a DVD. Thus, the database only represents the full population of 
officer/citizen interactions recorded on in-car mounted video systems for the past 30 
days.  
 I sampled the available database at the Kernersville Police Department by 
selecting 400 video files, with the hope of viewing at least 300 officer/citizen 
interactions. This number of interactions would have been equivalent to the 346 
compliance interactions viewed by the Mastofski et al. (1996) research project. 
Furthermore, 300 video files represented approximately 17% of the files contained within 
the Kernersville database.  
As already has been discussed, the Kernersville database is designed to 
automatically delete video files once they reach a given age based on the category they 
have been assigned to. This feature of the database could not be disengaged, nor could 
the sampled files by transferred into a protected folder or re-categorized to prevent the 
ageing out of files.  
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However, the technical staff at Kernersville Police Department was able to mark 
sampled files, to differentiate them from files which were not sampled.  I was able to use 
this same marking technique to sub-divide files into the base sample of 300 files and the 
remaining 100 files to be replacements in cases where one or more of the 300 video files 
in the base sample failed to contain an observable officer/citizen compliance interaction 
and thus proved to be unusable for this study.  
I was informed by the Kernersville Technical Staff that marking a video file as a 
part of the sample caused the database to create a new date stamp for the file. Each of the 
sampled video files would remain in their primary categories and would continue to be 
subject to the automatic deletion function of the system based on that category. On  
December 19, 2006, I used a random numbers table to sample 300 video files, marked as 
the primary sample, and a further sample of 100 video files, marked as replacement files. 
By marking these video files, I created a new date stamp for these files and thus insured 
that the first of these files would not be deleted for a minimum of 30 days.  
Due to the nature of the system, the database from which I drew the sample 
continued to change from the time that the sample was taken. New video files were added 
on a daily basis by the patrol officers of the Kernersville PD and video files which had 
not been marked for analysis continued to be automatically deleted by the system as they 
reached their category’s age limit. Thus, the population of the database, from which I 
sampled on December 19, 2006, only existed for one day.  
The files in the Kernersville PD database which were saved under the “Accidental 
Activation” category were not sampled because this category was reserved for activations 
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of in-car video systems which were unintentional. Additionally, video files saved under 
“Emergency Response” were not sampled because this footage is dedicated to times 
when officers are involved in responding to a given call using lights and siren, but which 
do not result in any additional law enforcement activity. Officer/citizen compliance 
interactions were not predicted to be present in any of the video files present in this 
categorization.  
I also omitted all files contained in the “Vehicle Chase” category due to their lack 
of relevance to officer/citizen interactions. Once a citizen has engaged in flight from an 
officer, the interaction already has met my criteria for a score of 10 on the compliance 
scale, indicating a complete failure to voluntarily comply. Furthermore, it is standard 
operating procedure for officers to use the force necessary to arrest the citizens in flight. 
Therefore, these video files can be predicted to yield no useful examples of officer/citizen 
interactions because they all involve noncompliance interactions or involuntary 
compliance interactions, even before the officer and citizen are within speaking distance. 
 The files saved under the category of “10-58/10-59” pertain to both the directing 
of traffic and funeral escorts, and these did not contain data relevant to this study. 
Additionally, no sampling was conducted of footage stored under the “Default” category 
because these video files had not been properly placed into the appropriate category.  
Of the remaining nine categories, a total of 2329 footage files were present on 
December 19, 2006. The footage contained was filmed between December 19, 2005 and 
December 19, 2006; however, as previously mentioned, only the categories of “DWI,” 
45 
 
 
“Use of Force,” and “Traffic Stop (Felony)” would have still been in the database a full 
year after recording, due to the database’s program of automatic erasing.  
I collected a sample of 300 data files, sampling from each of the remaining 
categories in proportion to the percentage of the total files each category contained. I then 
marked for viewing a sample of video files from each category. For example, the 224 
video files contained in the category of “DWI” (Driving While Impaired traffic stops) 
represented 14% of the total video files contained in the database of the nine usable 
categories. Therefore, 42 files, 14% of the overall sample of 300, were sampled from the 
DWI category. The sampling itself was conducted using a generated random numbers 
table. In addition, as a backup measure to account for any unusable files in the original 
sample, I took an additional sample of 100 data files, and once again sampled them in 
proportion to the number of data files per category.  
 As I conducted my research at Kernersville PD, I quickly discovered that many 
more data files of footage were unusable than I had anticipated. In many cases, the 
officer’s microphone failed to record the interaction. In others, the data files had been 
recorded by the dash cam footage of a backup/secondary officer. These data files almost 
always were unusable because the actual interaction was obscured by the primary 
officer’s vehicle. Additionally, because the microphone of the primary officer was not 
linked to the video of the secondary officer’s cruiser, no audio of the primary 
officer/primary citizen interaction was available.  
While in some cases I was able to compensate for these unusable files by drawing 
from the backup sample that was not always the case. In the case of some categories, i.e., 
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Traffic Stop (warning), Use of Force, Traffic Stop (felony), only a few files of footage 
had technical flaws and all could be replaced by the backup files. However, in the case of 
several of the categories--Motorist Assist, Traffic Accident, Investigation, Arrest, DWI, 
Traffic Stop (citation)—the number of unusable files outnumbered the number of usable 
backup files. As a result, the final sample consisted of 200 officer/citizen compliance 
interactions. 
When conducting the analysis of the smaller sample of footage taken from the 
King Police Department, I viewed the footage inside the main office of the King Police 
Department. The King database was significantly smaller than that of Kernersville Police 
Department. Rather than being divided by categories relating to a type of law 
enforcement activity, the King PD database is organized according to patrol squads. King 
Police Department has four squads, and each squad is made up of three to five officers. 
Within the squad’s footage folder, each officer has a folder containing the incidents that 
have been recorded by his/her cruiser mounted camera system. I sampled from each of 
the four squad folders, 13 officer/citizen compliance interactions from two of the squad 
folders and 12 interactions from the remaining squad folders. I used a random numbers 
table to select first an officer folder then used the same procedure to select a video file 
from within the officer’s folder. If the video file was unviewable or did not record an 
officer/citizen compliance interaction, the procedure was repeated within that same 
officer’s file in order to sample usable footage. I accumulated a total of 50 interactions 
from the King Police Department database. The footage from both departments was 
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coded using a coding sheet that asks questions intended to measure the following 
variables (See Appendix for Coding Sheet). 
Measures 
Quantitative Measures 
Dependent Variable 
 The dependent variable for this study is the variation in citizen voluntary 
compliance to officer verbal commands. Compliance is defined as behavior on the part 
of a citizen that occurs in response to a police officer’s verbal command(s) and that 
emulates the verbal command(s) to perform a specific act or to refrain from the 
performance of a specific act. Voluntary compliance is defined as compliance that is 
performed without the application of overt verbal threat or physical force, to include the 
brandishing of a weapon. Noncompliance is defined as any action(s) or inaction(s) on the 
part of a citizen that is contrary to a police officer’s verbal command(s). Involuntary 
compliance is defined as compliance that is performed following the application of overt 
verbal threat or physical force, to include the brandishing of a weapon. Failure to 
voluntarily comply is defined as any behavior that fails to meet the standard of voluntary 
compliance, to include both noncompliance and involuntary compliance. 
Compliance interaction is defined as any encounter between a police officer and 
citizen during which the officer issues a verbal command(s) to the citizen. Compliance 
interactions include encounters in which officers brandish weapons (use overt threat 
and/or physical force) to gain compliance. A compliance interaction is the interaction in 
which compliance is sought in one way or another. Voluntary compliance, involuntary 
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compliance, or noncompliance can result within these interactions. An example of a 
compliance interaction that does not end in either voluntary or involuntary compliance is 
when the officer issues a command and then leaves the situation or when the citizen falls 
unconscious before having the chance to either obey or disobey.  
This dependent variable was measured in two ways. The first is a bivariate 
assessment of the overall result of the compliance interaction. The interaction was coded 
as either resulting in citizen voluntary compliance or in a citizen failing to voluntarily 
comply. The second measure of the dependent variable recorded the voluntary 
compliance of the citizen on a scale using a dimensional variable assessment, with 1 
indicating total voluntary compliance and 10 indicating total lack of voluntary 
compliance.  The continuum-based method of assessing voluntary compliance of a citizen 
is inherently subjective to some degree, but the following criteria were used when scaling 
interactions along the continuum:  
 1. If at any time involuntary compliance is obtained by the officer through the use 
of  force (not to include normal handcuffing procedures), the voluntary compliance of the 
citizen was assessed as no less than an 8; 
 2. If the citizen flees the interaction, the compliance of the citizen was assessed as 
a 10; 
 3. Ciizens who voluntarily comply with officers’ commands to the extent that 
they allow themselves to be handcuffed were assessed as having a compliance rating of 
no greater than 7; 
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 4. Citizens who fail to comply with verbal commands due to obvious drug and/or 
alcohol impairment were assessed as having a lower compliance rating than those who 
intentionally fail to comply; 
 5. Those who consistently interrupt the verbal commands of the officer received a 
compliance rating of no less than 3; 
 6. Those who were disrespectful of or sarcastic towards the officer received a 
compliance rating of no less than 3; and  
 7. Citizens on whom some level of physical force was used in order to obtain 
involuntary compliance were coded as having a compliance score of 8 or above. 
Independent Variables 
 A variety of independent variables taken primarily from the social interaction 
perspective and the theory of judgmental heuristics were measured in addition to basic 
demographic information about the primary officer and the primary citizen. The primary 
officer, in those cases where more than one officer is present, is the officer issuing the 
majority of commands and/or conducting the majority of the investigation. It is standard 
operating procedure in law enforcement for one officer to take on the role of “contact 
officer” while the other officers on the scene function as “cover officers” who rarely 
converse with citizens. However, because both King PD and Kernersville PD only 
maintain one officer per patrol car, few examples of multiple officer interactions were 
included in the study. It was a much more common occurrence for multiple citizens to be 
involved in the interaction. The primary citizen is the citizen with whom the primary 
officer converses for the majority of the interaction. In all interactions involving vehicles, 
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which made up the majority of the viewed interactions, the driver was classified as the 
primary citizen.  
Social interactionism. Normative and instrumental independent variables 
suggested by the literature in social interactionism were measured in this study.  
The normative variables measured in this study include: demographics of the 
primary officer and primary citizen, social status of the citizen, location of the interaction, 
manner of initiation of the interaction, amount of respect shown by officer(s) towards 
citizen(s), amount of respect shown by citizen(s) towards officer(s), whether or not an 
officer has prior knowledge of a citizen, the skill of an officer, and the strength of 
evidence against the citizen.  
The demographic factors of gender, age, race and ethnicity were measured for 
both the primary officer and the primary citizen. The Mastrofski et al. (1996) research 
noted that demographic features of an individual in compliance interactions can influence 
that person’s likelihood of demonstrating a given behavior, in the case of this study, 
voluntary compliance. However, the research also revealed that demographic features of 
both officers and citizens relative to each other can affect compliance interactions 
(Mastrofski et al. 1996) [see Appendix, questions #2-5 and #7-10 on the Coding Sheet] 
It was difficult to assess a citizen’s socioeconomic status utilizing the data source 
of patrol cruiser-mounted video systems. Because of this, I used the approximate 
monetary value of a citizen’s vehicle as a proxy for SES. I took into account the make 
and model of the vehicle, as well as its age and state of repair. Due to the data source for 
this study, the vast majority of citizens observed were inside a car (see question #14 on 
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the Coding Sheet). Because of this measure’s inherent subjectivity, I used the following 
procedures to standardize the ranking processes. Vehicles which had large amounts of 
body damage and/or cracked windows and/or were of an older vintage than 1995 were 
recorded as having low monetary value. Vehicles which had body/window damage 
and/or were at least pre-2000 vintage were recorded as having low-medium monetary 
value. Standard vehicles (sedans, pick-up trucks, vans, SUVs) and brands (Ford, Toyota, 
Chevy, Honda, Saturn.) and those of a post-2000 vintage were ranked as having medium 
value. Vehicles which were of higher quality manufacture (BMW, Cadillac, Lincoln, 
Lexus, Mercedes) or which were a specialty type of vehicle (sports car, large SUVs) were 
ranked as having high-medium monetary value. Vehicles which were restored-classic or 
custom vehicles or those which were produced by extremely high end manufacturers 
(Porsche, Lamborghini, Jaguar, Hummer) were ranked as having a high monetary value 
(see Appendix, question #14 on the Coding Sheet).  
The normative variable of legitimacy is defined as the degree to which those 
issuing orders are perceived to possess a legal and moral entitlement to obedience. The 
physical location of an encounter is an important factor in judging the legitimacy of the 
encounter. Police actions that take place in public areas are seen as more legitimate than 
those that intrude on the private property of a citizen. Thus, one measure of legitimacy is 
the location of the interaction (see question #21 on the Coding Sheet). For this study, 
private property was coded as the location with the least legitimacy for law enforcement 
officers. Public vehicular areas are more legitimate because these are locations on private 
property which the public has an expectation of freedom of entrance, for example a 
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business’s parking lot. “Streets and highways” are the most public and therefore most 
legitimate setting for an interaction.  
A second measure of legitimacy is the manner of initiation of the interaction. 
Citizens tend to view police presence and orders as having more legitimacy when the 
officer is brought into the interaction by another citizen. Inversely, officers who initiate a 
compliance interaction are seen as having less legitimacy and therefore citizens will be 
less likely to comply with officer commands in these interactions (see question # 17 on 
the Coding Sheet). 
Another measure of legitimacy is the politeness of the officer. Actors tend to 
expect respect from others and associate a demonstration of basic esteem as fundamental 
even in interactions with superiors. To the degree that an individual is not treated with 
respect, that same individual will view themselves as more isolated from social values 
and thus less likely to conform to socially expected behaviors. In the case of 
officer/citizen compliance interactions, this translates into an increased proclivity for 
disobedience on the part of citizens when they feel disrespected. Officer politeness was 
measured by whether the officer uses a title such as “sir” or “ma’am” when speaking to 
the citizen, as well as the officer’s overall level of respect for the citizen during the 
interaction. This second, broader question takes into account the officer’s tone of voice, 
word usage, and body language (see questions #40 and #41 on the Coding Sheet). 
Respect is an inherently subjective variable; however, the following tools were used to 
aid the measurement process. If an officer addresses a citizen in a demeaning tone of 
voice, laughs at the citizen, mocks the citizen, ignores the citizen, or uses any derogatory 
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nickname or slur (boy, punk, etc.), the officer was coded as showing disrespect. If the 
officer treats the citizen in a professional, courteous manner, uses a professional or 
friendly tone of voice, allows the citizen to ask questions and answers those questions in 
a polite manner, the officer was coded as having treated the citizen with respect. If the 
officer did not display any of these behaviors but instead completes the interaction in a 
business- like manner without showing any obvious signs of disrespect or respect, the 
interaction was coded as neutral. An officer’s use of threat against a citizen also was 
recorded. Threats are an expression of disrespect and thus an officer’s use of threats is 
expected to decrease a citizen’s likelihood of compliance. If the officer issues any direct 
threats, of legal sanction, physical harm, or other penalty, the officer is coded as using 
threats (see questions #26 on the Coding Sheet). 
 The strength of the evidence against a suspect also is predicted to have an effect 
on a citizen’s likelihood of voluntarily compliance. Strength of evidence was measured 
by noting if an officer observes a crime, has physical evidence of a crime, or obtains a 
confession. However, my ability to assess the evidence strength in the situation was 
limited by my data source. I rated the strength of the evidence against the citizen based 
on these three measures which in turn are based on the officer’s statements and/or any 
visible clues present (see questions #44-46 on the Coding Sheet). 
 An additional normative variable drawn from the SI perspective is the officer’s 
prior knowledge of a citizen. The Mastrofski et al. study (1996) revealed that citizens 
known previously by officers were less likely to comply with officer commands. This 
variable was measured by noting any verbal indications on the part of the officer or the 
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citizen that they had met previously. These include statements such as: “last time I saw 
you . . .,” “do you remember me?” and so forth (see question #41 on the Coding Sheet). 
 According to the SI perspective, an officer’s skills and abilities are factors that 
can affect whether a citizen voluntarily complies with commands. Citizens see officers 
who are more skilled as having greater legitimacy, and therefore the citizen is more likely 
to comply with the officer’s commands. Mastrofski et al. (1996) found that both of their 
measures of officer skill, years of service, and dedication to community-oriented policing 
increased the likelihood of compliance. However, these measures of officer skill are not 
available using this data source. Instead, I used the following measures to assess officer 
skills: the approximate age of the officer, the presence of rank insignia on an officer’s 
uniform, and indications that an officer is using the technique of verbal judo. Verbal judo 
is a highly regimented conversation style that officers across the country are taught in 
their in-service training. This technique prescribes the use of certain statements in a 
certain order both to conduct traffic stops and to combat citizen noncompliance (see 
questions #3, #43, #51 on the Coding Sheet). 
 Instrumental factors influencing compliance include those indicating the tendency 
to conform in order to avoid adverse consequences. In the case of interactions with police 
officers, these adverse consequences can be represented by “formal sanctions (arrest, 
conviction, and court-imposed punishment) or informal sanctions (shaming or the 
disapproval of those who matter)” (Mastrofski et al. 1996:273). The instrumental 
variables measured in this study include: the manner of initiation of the interaction, the 
seriousness of the crime under investigation, the number of officers and citizens present 
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in the interaction, the intoxication of a citizen, the emotionality of a citizen, and finally 
whether or not the citizen is armed. 
One instrumental factor which social interactionism predicts citizens to take into 
account when weighing the costs and benefits of compliance vs. noncompliance is the 
seriousness of the problem under investigation. Mastrofski et al. (1996) found the more 
serious the problem under investigation, the less likely citizens were to comply with 
commands. I replicated the measure used in the Mastofski et al. (1996) study which lists 
problems in ascending order of seriousness as: traffic, minor offense, drugs, serious 
offense (see question #50 on the Coding Sheet). I also added a similar question which I 
think is a more rich assessment of the crime under investigation. It ranks problems in 
ascending order of seriousness as: speeding offense, miscellaneous traffic offense, city 
ordinance violation, DWI, misdemeanor offense, felony offense (see question #18 on the 
Coding Sheet). 
 According to the social interactionist perspective, the number of secondary 
citizens and officers present at an interaction are instrumental factors that can influence 
compliance. Measures of both variables are included (see questions #15 and #16 on 
Coding Sheet). 
The capacity for rational judgment is the degree to which a citizen’s cognitive 
powers are diminished. Social interactionist theorists state that “the accuracy of the 
balance-of-power estimates depends on the capacity of the potential offender to obtain an 
accurate perception of the situation and to foresee the consequences of different levels of 
resistance” (Mastrofski et al. 1996:274). Therefore, if a citizen’s ability for rational 
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thought is inhibited, the likelihood of citizen voluntary compliance is affected. Several 
factors can affect a citizen’s capacity for rational judgment, including: emotionality, 
intoxication, and mental disorder/impairment. Measures of each are included (see 
question #11 and #47-49 on the Coding Sheet). A related variable possibly impairing 
rational judgment is the presence of a communication difficulty. Individuals with some 
form of communication disorder, or who do not speak English fluently, may have 
difficulty perceiving information necessary to make appropriate cost-benefit assessments. 
Even though such an individual may be perfectly capable of reasoning once having 
accumulated all the information needed, this individual may have trouble gathering such 
information (see #13 on the Coding Sheet). 
 Social interactionist theorists also predict that any factors that give citizens an 
advantage in a situation can decrease the likelihood of compliance. These instrumental 
factors include whether the citizen is armed or of a larger physical build than the officer 
issuing the commands (see #6, #12, and #35 on the Coding Sheet). 
Judgmental heuristics. Several of the cognitive shortcuts suggested by the 
judgmental heuristic literature cannot be measured extensively given the data source used 
here, and the judgmental heuristic of “scarcity” cannot be measured at all. This study 
includes measures of the judgmental heuristics of “authority,” “reciprocation,” 
“consistency,” “conformity/social proof,” and “liking.” 
The role of a law enforcement officer carries with it a high degree of authority. 
However, I measured independent variables which can further increase the officer’s level 
of authority. Measures of authority include: the type of clothing being worn by the 
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officer, the state of the officer’s clothing, the presence of rank insignia on the officer’s 
uniform, and the officer’s demonstration of legal expertise. The type of clothing being 
worn by the officer was measured in terms of formal (class A) uniform as compared to 
less formal uniforms (class B) and plain clothes (non-uniform attire). Uniforms which 
include a tie were coded as class A. Any uniform lacking a tie was recorded as class B, 
and non-uniform attire included all other types of dress (suits, dresses, t-shirts, etc.) that 
were not departmental issue uniforms (see #51 on the Coding Sheet). 
The state of the officer’s clothing was measured in terms of tidiness as opposed to 
being unkempt. This is an inherently subjective measure, but the proxy variables used are 
the presence of wrinkles, dirt or stains, un-tucked shirts and worn clothing. These items 
caused an officer’s uniform to be classified as unkempt (see #52 on the Coding Sheet). 
Rank insignia includes stripes on the sleeves which indicate the rank of Corporal (two 
stripes) and Sergeant (three stripes) as well as small metal pins on the collar of a uniform 
which indicate the ranks of Lieutenant (one bar), Captain (two bars), or Major (an oak 
leaf) (see #53 on the Coding Sheet). Demonstration of legal expertise is an inherently 
subjective variable; however, the proxy variables recorded to measure legal expertise 
include: the officer explaining a law or elements of a crime to a citizen, or the officer 
explaining court procedures to the citizen, the officer citing general statutes or case law to 
a citizen (see #54 on the Coding Sheet). 
 The second judgmental heuristic included as an independent variable is 
reciprocity. To measure reciprocity, I noted any instance of the officer providing some 
form of assistance to the citizen. Such assistance may engender a feeling of indebtedness 
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that the citizen may feel towards the officer prior to compliance being sought. A wide 
variety of assistance could be provided a citizen by an officer, but four common types of 
assistance that officers provide during traffic stops were included as well as space to code 
for any other type of assistance that may be provided a citizen. The most common forms 
of assistance are: an officer notifying the citizen of mechanical problems with the car, an 
officer providing navigational directions, an officer providing court advice, or an officer 
informing the citizen that charges against him/her will be reduced. This variable is 
inherently subjective; however, detailed notes were taken as to what type of assistance 
was provided (see #58 on the Coding Sheet). 
 The judgmental heuristic of consistency was measured by whether the officer 
triggers the “foot in the door” compliance technique by making a minor request of the 
citizen. If the citizen complies with a minor command/request at the outset of the 
interaction, according to judgmental heuristics, he/she will be more likely to comply with 
the officer’s commands throughout the interaction. This independent variable was 
measured by measuring the officer’s use of two common initial officer  
commands/ requests for identification and requests for movement towards an officer. The 
citizen’s response to these initial command(s) was recorded. An extra measure was 
included to record an officer issuing another small command. Detailed notes were taken 
explaining why a particular command meets the requirements of a small initial command. 
Examples of officer commands that fit into this category were commands for the citizen 
to make his/her hands visible, and commands to roll down a window or to lower the 
volume on a radio (see #60-65 on the Coding Sheet). 
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 The judgmental heuristic of conformity/social proof was measured by noting the 
voluntary compliance of a primary citizen when compared to the voluntary compliance of 
secondary officer(s) and/or secondary citizen(s) within the same interaction. According to 
the judgmental heuristic of conformity/social proof, citizen(s) are more likely to comply 
if those around them are complying. Compliance for the primary citizens was measured 
on the same ten-point scale as the dependent variable measuring citizen voluntary 
compliance. The compliance of the secondary officer(s) and secondary citizen(s) was 
recorded using the same bivariate measure used for the dependent variable of primary 
citizen voluntary compliance (see #23 and #66 on the Coding Sheet). 
 The judgmental heuristic of liking is difficult to measure using this data source. 
The degree to which one individual “likes” another individual is highly subjective in 
nature, and trying to infer the degree of positive feelings one has for another by watching 
video of an interaction is not feasible. However, a useful proxy for this variable is the 
occurrence of an officer requesting leniency for a citizen from another officer in the 
presence of a citizen. This variable has the added benefit of measuring the affect of the 
“good cop/bad cop” technique. Proxies for liking then might include phrases such as: 
“give him/her a break,” “is there any way we can work this out,” and “why don’t we 
reconsider this.” Detailed notes were recorded for this measure (see #67 on the Coding 
Sheet).  
 The final influence upon compliance theorized by judgmental heuristics is that of 
scarcity. In many situations, the belief that an item or opportunity is of limited quality, or 
only available for a short period of time, might influence an individual to comply more 
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readily with the commands of those who offer the opportunity or item. However, this 
type of situation does not seem to develop in officer/citizen interactions on a typical 
basis, because officers, unlike car salesmen, do not have control over a valued item or 
typically any type of positive opportunity. The only exceptions to this include scenarios 
where suspects may be offered leniency in return for acting as an informant or for 
producing a confession. However, neither of these particular types of officer/citizen 
compliance interactions was likely to take place in a venue which will be recorded by a 
cruiser-mounted video system. Instead, they typically take place inside, usually in some 
sort of interview room. Therefore, I did not code for the variable of scarcity.  
Qualitative Measures 
  
 This study is primarily focused on quantitative measures. The literature which 
speaks about compliance, in general, has traditionally treated compliance as an outcome 
influenced by a multitude of independent quantitative factors. Specifically, the theories of 
social interactionism and judgmental heuristics, which serve as the main foundation for 
this research, suggest a myriad of factors which influence a citizen’s likelihood of 
compliance; however, all of the suggested factors are assessed using quantitative 
measures.  
As will be discussed at length in the next section, the means of assessing the 
interactions which were viewed, and consequently the method of analysis of these 
interactions, was almost entirely conducted in a quantitative manner. However, there is 
documentation in the literature suggesting that qualitative measures and analysis could 
provide a richer understanding of officer/citizen compliance interactions.  
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A qualitative analysis of officer/citizen compliance interactions does not appear in 
the literature. Yet, sociologists who adhere to the theory of Dramaturgy have used 
qualitative analysis to assess a wide variety of social interactions, including those which 
are compliance oriented. The field of Dramaturgy, pioneered by Erving Goffman, is 
focused on the rituals within interactions. Goffman advocated the use of ethnography to 
examine “that class of events which occurs during co-presence and by virtue of co-
presence” (Goffman 1967:1). The field of Dramaturgy studies interpersonal interactions 
with the understanding that social interactions involve a presentation and preservation of 
face, or character. In turn the other players in the interaction present their face and the 
conclusion of the interaction itself is negotiated with the end of preserving the face of 
both parties involved. 
The literature does not reveal prior use of this theory to assess officer/citizen 
compliance interactions, though the theoretical perspective does provide an interesting 
perspective on social interactions in general and compliance interactions specifically. 
Sociologists who ascribe to the theory of Dramaturgy use the research method of 
ethnography in order to assess social interactions. “The value of Ethnography as a social 
research method is founded upon the existence of such variations in cultural patterns 
across and within societies and their significance for understanding social processes” 
(Hammersley and Atkinson 1995:9). Ethnographic research is highly qualitative, and 
requires researchers to assess social situations and relationships at a very deep level  
While this research has been designed to serve primarily as a quantitative analysis 
of officer/citizen compliance interactions, in an attempt to maintain a small measure of 
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the potential usefulness of qualitative analysis, detailed qualitative notes were kept on the 
sampled interactions. In cases where the quantitative measures failed to provide a full 
description of the compliance interactions, the additional qualitative notes served to 
record some of the nuances of these interactions. Though these notes cannot be 
considered ethnographic research, they did provide for useful analysis and discussion 
concerning these social interactions, which would have been lost had this study been 
designed as solely quantitative. 
Analysis 
 The data for this research are video footage of officer/citizen compliance 
interactions recorded by cruiser-mounted video systems. However, what exactly are such 
data called? The most appropriate term is a document. Documents are usually thought to 
be defined by their text. However, the individual officer/citizen interaction recordings 
also are documents comprised of the text of the dialog and the body language and voice 
intonations of interaction participants. I conducted a form of document analysis, termed 
conversation analysis, wherein I used a “technique for analyzing naturally occurring 
conversations” (Neuendorf 2002:7). Though conversation analysis “generally falls within 
the rubric of ethnomethodology” (Neuendorf 2002:7), this research utilized hypothesis 
testing rather than the more meticulous individual case analysis common to 
ethnomethodological research.  
After completing a conversion analysis of a sample of footage from the 
Kernersville and King Police Department databases, I used ordinal logistic regression to 
test several hypotheses drawn from the two guiding theoretical perspectives. Again, it is 
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important to note that many of these hypotheses include independent variables drawn 
from the social interactionism and judgmental heuristics literature; however, this study 
does not engage in hypothesis testing for the goal of determining the value of one theory 
over another. The hypotheses simply guide the analysis to determine factors most 
influential to the dependent variable of citizen voluntary compliance. 
While the majority of the hypotheses are informed by either the social 
interactionist perspective or judgmental heuristics, I have included several independent 
variables and related hypotheses that I argue may be of interest to law enforcement 
agencies in general and the Kernersville PD and King PD in particular. For example, I 
coded for whether the interaction occurs during daylight hours or after dark. This variable 
does not fit neatly into the theories of SI or JH; however, I anticipate that law 
enforcement agencies may be interested in whether officers are more likely to encounter 
noncompliance during day shifts or night shifts because social context shapes social 
interactions.  
These data and the hypotheses I examine are best evaluated using ordinal logistic 
regression. Because preliminary analysis revealed little variation in the bivariate measure 
of citizen voluntary compliance, I focused the analysis on the scaled measure of the 
dependent variable. Ordinal logistic regression was used due to its superior ability to 
assess the relative effect, positive or negative, of each of the independent variables on 
likelihood of citizen voluntary compliance as measured as a scaled variable.  
 Ordinal logistic regression, as the name implies, is based on logistic regression 
which is utilized for analyses of variables on a bivariate dependent variable. Logistic 
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regression involves the creation of a model of fit, which functions similarly to the “line of 
best fit” utilized in ordinary linear regression. However, lines of best fit only can be 
created if both the independent variable and the dependent variable are measured on an 
ordinal scale. Logistic regression allows for analysis of the relationship between 
dichotomous, categorical or continuous independent variables and a dichotomous 
dependent variable.  
Logistic regression creates a model of fit and utilizes a logarithm of odds that an 
event occurs, or a “logit.” Since logistic regression is performed on data with a 
dichotomous dependent variable, the odds of the dependent variable occurring is divided 
by the odds of the dependent variable failing to occur. The “number of events divided by 
the number of non-events” (Norušis 2007:70) is then multiplied by a coefficient, which is 
the change in the logit based on the value of the independent (predictor) variable. Once 
the model has been created, the observed cases then can be compared to the model and 
the fit of the model and the significance of the effect of the independent variable upon the 
dependent variable can be assessed. 
The fact that the dependent variable in this research is ordinal rather than 
dichotomous precludes the use of logistic regression. However, a modified version of 
logistic regression, called ordinal logistic regression, can be used. Ordinal logistic 
regression differs from logistic regression in that “instead of considering the probability 
of an individual event, you consider the probability of that event and all events that are 
ordered before it” (Norušis 2007:70).  
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Ordinal logistic regression utilizes a type of model building which breaks each 
possible response of an ordinal dependent variable into a series of binary logistic 
regressions. In the case of this study, the model performs a series of simultaneous 
models, the first being a primary citizen’s degree of compliance of 1 or below, then a 
primary citizen’s degree of compliance of 2 or below, and so on and so forth through a 
compliance level of 9. The primary citizen’s degree of compliance of 10 or below is not 
run since obviously it would encompass all valid cases. “The analysis that mimics this 
method of dichotomizing the outcome, in which the successive dichotomizations form 
cumulative ‘splits’ to the data, is referred to as proportional or cumulative odds” 
(O’Connell 1995:28). Therefore, by using this cumulative odds model, ordinal logistic 
regression allows for statements regarding the effect of independent variables upon an 
ordinal dependent variable. 
The cumulative odds model, though well-suited for this study, does have the 
limitation that the division of the cases requires that some cases be present in each of the 
ordinal categories of the dependent variable. This research only included 200 cases from 
Kernersville Police Department. Further, the dependent variable revealed little variation 
in the citizen’s degree of compliance, with 95.5% of cases divided between the three 
highest levels of compliance, and no examples of interactions where the primary citizen’s 
compliance was coded 6, 8 or 9. Due to these considerations, I collapsed the dependent 
variable of citizen compliance, allowing the effect of independent variables to be 
analyzed. As I was conducting this recoding, I also took into consideration the format of 
the scale which I had used and the ease with which the findings could be presented. 
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Therefore, as seen in Table 1, cases where the primary citizen had been coded as 1, 
representing full voluntary compliance, I recoded these cases as 4, which also now 
represents full voluntary compliance. Cases coded as 2, representing slight failure to 
voluntarily comply, were recoded as 3, representing slight failure to voluntarily comply. I 
combined cases where the citizen had been coded as 3 or 4 as 2, representing a moderate 
failure to comply, and made the seven cases where a citizen was coded 5 through 10 into 
category 1, representing a gross failure to comply. This new division preserves an 
appreciation for the basic differences observed in the compliance of citizens, while at the 
same time conforming itself to the realities of the data and the need to perform a valid 
analysis. Additionally, by inverting the scale used in the coding sheet, which provided for 
greater ease in recording the data, it is possible to provide for a more intuitive discussion 
of the results, with a higher number representing a greater degree of compliance. 
 
Table 1 
Collapsed Dependent Variable 
Final Coding of Compliance   Original Coding of Compliance 
Gross Failure to Voluntarily Comply 1 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 
Moderate Failure to Voluntarily Comply 2 3, 4 
Slight Failure to Voluntarily Comply 3 2 
Full Voluntary Compliance 4 1 
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Research Hypotheses 
In order to answer my research questions, I utilized the following specific 
hypotheses. I have divided these hypotheses according to the theories on which they are 
predicated. 
Social Interactionism Hypotheses 
Normative Variables 
 1. Citizens will be less likely to voluntarily comply with officer commands if the 
officer shows the citizen disrespect. 
 2. Citizens will be less likely to voluntarily comply with officer commands if the 
officer issues threats towards the citizen.  
 3. Citizens will be less likely to voluntarily comply with officer commands if the 
officer has prior knowledge of the citizen.  
 4. White citizens will be less likely to voluntarily comply with the commands of a 
non-white officer. 
 5. Citizens will be more likely to voluntarily comply with officer commands if 
there is strong evidence against the citizen.  
 6. Citizens will be more likely to voluntarily comply with officer commands if the 
interaction occurs in a more public location.  
 7. Citizens will be less likely to comply with officer commands if the officer has 
initiated the compliance interaction.  
 8. Citizens will be more likely to voluntarily comply with officer commands if an 
officer with rank is present in the interaction.  
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 9. Citizens will be more likely to voluntarily comply with officer commands if an 
officer uses verbal judo in the interaction.  
 10. Citizens will be more likely to voluntarily comply with officer commands if 
the citizen is non-white. 
 11. Citizens will be less likely to voluntarily comply with officer commands if the 
citizen is male. 
 12. Citizens will be more likely to voluntarily comply with officer commands if 
the citizen is non-white and the officer issuing the command is white. 
Instrumental Variables 
 1. Citizens will be more likely to voluntarily comply with officer commands as 
the severity of the crime increases. 
 2. Citizens will be less likely to voluntarily comply with officer commands if the 
citizen is intoxicated. 
 3. Citizens will be less likely to voluntarily comply with officer commands if a 
citizen has mental handicap/illness. 
 4. Citizens will be less likely to voluntarily comply with officer commands if a 
citizen is emotional.  
Judgmental Heuristics 
 1. Citizens will be more likely to voluntarily comply with officer commands if an 
officer demonstrates legal expertise. 
 2. Citizens will be more likely to voluntarily comply with officer commands if an 
officer’s uniform is tidy.  
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 3. Citizens will be more likely to voluntarily comply with officer commands if the 
officer has rank. 
 4. Citizens will be more likely to voluntarily comply with officer commands if an 
officer is wearing a class A uniform.  
 5. Citizens will be more likely to voluntarily comply with officer commands if an 
officer provides a service for a citizen.  
 6. Citizens will be more likely to voluntarily comply with officer commands if an 
officer informs a citizen that he/she will be reducing the amount or severity of charges 
against him/her. 
 7. Citizens will be more likely to voluntarily comply with officer commands if a 
citizen complies with a minor initial officer command. 
 8. Citizens will be more likely to voluntarily comply with officer commands if 
other citizen’s comply with an officer’s commands. 
 9. Citizens will be more likely to voluntarily comply with officer commands if 
secondary officers comply with a primary officer’s commands. 
 10. Citizens will be more likely to voluntarily comply with officer commands if 
an officer acts as an advocate for a citizen.  
Additional Hypotheses of Interest 
 1. Citizens will be equally likely to comply with officer commands in interactions 
involving King Police Department officers as those involving Kernersville Police 
Department. 
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 2. Citizens will be less likely to voluntarily comply with officer commands if the 
citizen has a larger physical build than the officer that is present in an interaction.  
 3. Citizens will be less likely to comply with officer commands as the age of the 
officer decreases. 
 4. Citizens will be less likely to comply with officer commands as the age of the 
citizen decreases. 
 5. Citizens will be less likely to voluntarily comply with officer commands if the 
citizen does not speak English fluently. 
 6. Citizens will be less likely to voluntarily comply with officer commands if the 
citizen is occupying a vehicle of less monetary value. 
 7. Citizens will be more likely to comply with officer commands if additional 
officers are present. 
 9. Citizens will be less likely to comply with officer commands if additional 
citizens are present. 
 10. Citizens will be less likely to voluntarily comply with officer commands if the 
interaction takes place at night. 
 11. Citizens will be more likely to voluntarily comply with officer commands if 
the officer uses methods of obtaining voluntary compliance other than threatening.  
 12. Citizens will be more likely to voluntarily comply with officer commands if 
the officer notifies the citizen that the interaction is being recorded. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics  
 This study examines factors that influence the likelihood of citizen voluntary 
compliance to the verbal commands of a law enforcement officer during an encounter. In 
order to accomplish this goal, the research is guided by several hypotheses suggested by 
the social interaction perspective and the theory of judgmental heuristics. Before 
discussing specific hypotheses, it is appropriate to provide descriptive data for the data 
set. 
Demographics of Interaction Participants 
Demographically, little variation exists among the primary officers engaged in the 
interactions. In only 6% of the interactions was the primary officer a female. In terms of 
age, 88% of the interactions involved officers who were 20-39 years of age. Every single 
interaction featured a primary officer who was white, and none of the interactions 
featured a primary officer who was Hispanic. Thus, the primary officers present in the 
officer/citizen interactions that I sampled were almost exclusively 20-39 year old white, 
non-Hispanic males. 
 In terms of the officers’ physical builds, 86.5% of interactions featured a primary 
officer who had a medium or large physical build, and the description of muscular or 
obese physical build could be used to describe officers in less than 31% of interactions. 
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As mentioned earlier, this variable was subjective, and the ability of the researcher to 
accurately estimate the build of individuals involved was heavily influenced by lighting, 
the angle of the camera, and the amount of clothing worn by the officer/citizen.  
At this time, it is appropriate to mention that since Kernersville Police 
Department employs approximately twenty-four patrol officers at any given time, the 
same officers appeared in the footage of multiple officer/citizen interactions. Also officer 
representation in the complete database of video footage, and consequently my random 
sample of this database, is to some extent self-selected. For example, over 33% of the 
original sample was from the category of traffic stop (citation) or traffic stop (warning). 
Traffic stops are, by in large, self- initiated activities, and consequently some patrol 
officers will be prone to make a higher number of traffic stops in a given shift than 
others.  
This tendency could result in a specific officer submitting an unrepresentatively 
high number of traffic stop data files to the database and consequently being the recorded 
primary officer in a high number of officer/citizen interactions studied. Therefore, it is 
possible, though unlikely, that only one muscular patrol officer is employed with the 
Kernersville Police Department and that he/she was the primary officer in the 27 
interactions involving a muscular officer that I viewed. I did not keep record of the 
identity of the primary officers in interactions and, thus, I have no way of either 
confirming or discounting this possibility.  
The demographics for the primary citizens involved in the sampled interactions 
were more varied. Only 64% of the interactions involved a male primary citizen, while 
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68% involved a white primary citizen and 20.5% involved a black primary citizen. Also, 
11% of interactions involved a primary citizen who was Hispanic. The physical build of 
the primary citizens present in the interactions was difficult to measure. The majority of 
usable interactions involved officers conducting some sort of enforcement action which 
took place directly in front of their police cruiser and involved a citizen who was 
occupying a vehicle.  
Very often the citizen in the interaction is not visible on the video footage. In 
57.5% of the Kernersville PD interactions, I was not able to determine the citizen’s 
physical build. Of the interactions in which I was able to make a determination, 40% of 
the primary citizens were of a slight physical build and 45.9% were of a medium physical 
build. Only one interaction involved a citizen coded as muscular, and in only six 
interactions was a citizen considered to be obese.  
Descriptive Data of Interaction Exchange 
In addition to recording basic information about the officers and citizens involved 
in the interactions, I recorded descriptive data of the interaction itself. Though these 
variables are not directly tied to a hypothesis, they do help to describe the makeup of the 
typical interaction. As seen in Table 2, miscellaneous traffic incidents were the most 
common conduct under investigation at the time of the interaction. Traffic-related 
offenses (speeding, traffic, and DWI) account for 70% of all sampled interactions. 
As Table 3 shows, the most common disposition of the recorded interactions 
(34%) was a citation issued to the primary citizen while 23.5% of interactions ended in 
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the primary officer making an arrest, and 22.5% of interactions ended in information 
being given to the primary citizen.  
 
Table 2 
Crime under Investigation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Enforcement Dispositions 
Enforcement 
Disposition 
Information 
Given 
22.5% 
(45) 
Verbal 
Warning 
7.5% 
(15) 
Written 
Warning 
7.5% 
(15) 
Citation 
Issued 
34.5% 
(69) 
Arrest 
Made 
23.5% 
(47) 
All 
Other 
4.5% 
(9) 
 
 
Crime     
 Speeding   15.50% 
    (31) 
 Traffic Offense  37.00% 
    (74) 
 City Ordinance Violation 4.00% 
    (8) 
 Driving While Intoxicated 17.50% 
    (35) 
 Misdemeanor  18.00% 
    (36) 
 Felony   3.50% 
    (7) 
 Unknown   3.50% 
    (7) 
 Other   4.00% 
    (8) 
75 
 
 
Dependent Variables 
The dependent variable, citizen voluntary compliance to the verbal commands of 
law enforcement officers, was coded in two ways. First, I coded compliance as a purely 
binary variable. All interactions were coded as either compliance interactions or as non-
compliance. Only two interactions out of 200 involved instances of primary citizens 
failing to voluntarily comply with verbal commands of officers. While many interactions 
involved citizens who were at some level uncooperative, impolite, or slow to respond, 
only two required officers to impel involuntary compliance by the use of force. 
This lack of variation in the dependent variable creates a challenge analytically; 
however, it is not altogether surprising or unanticipated. Voluntary compliance to officer 
commands was predicted by the literature to be the outcome of the vast majority of 
officer/citizen interactions. Both macro and micro theories of power point to the fact that 
individuals are extremely likely to comply with commands from an authority figure.  
The lack of variation in the dependent variable of primary citizen voluntary 
compliance prevents meaningful analysis from being performed. Therefore, in order to 
allow for analysis, I also coded primary citizen voluntary compliance as an ordinal 
variable ranging from one to ten, which as previously mentioned, was compressed down 
to an ordinal variable ranging from one to four to allow for ease of analysis. 
The results of this alternate coding of the dependent variable produced slightly 
more variation, though variation is still limited. But, by using this more nuanced 
classification, I was able to draw distinctions between citizens who voluntarily complied 
with officer commands. The shortcoming of the binary assessment of compliance is that 
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it forced the observer to look at the end of the interaction and classify only the outcome 
of the exchange. However, an ordinal assessment of citizen compliance allows 
differentiation between citizens who were compliant throughout from those who were 
uncooperative, defiant and rude, yet voluntarily complied in the end.  
As shown in Table 4, the majority of interactions, 66%, contained primary 
citizens who were completely compliant. In other words, the citizens were polite and 
cooperative with officers from the beginning of the interaction until the end. However, 
21% of interactions involved primary citizens who were generally compliant, but who 
were less than fully cooperative and/or demonstrated some level of irritation with the 
officers. In these interactions, the level of citizen dissatisfaction could usually be ignored 
by the primary officer and did not interfere with the enforcement activities being carried 
out.  
 
Table 4 
Adjusted Degree of Primary Citizen Voluntary Compliance 
 
 
 
Degree of 
Compliance 
       
 Gross Failure to Voluntarily Comply 1 3.5%   (7) 
  
Moderate Failure to Voluntarily Comply 2 9.5%   (19) 
  
Slight Failure to Voluntarily Comply 3 21%   (42) 
  
Full Voluntary Compliance 4 66%   (132) 
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This type of behavior was exhibited by primary citizens in another 9.5% of 
interactions; however, the citizens’ irritation and questioning were more extensively 
expressed. This degree of citizen irritation required officers to respond in some way. In 
some cases where the officer chose to ignore the citizen’s behavior, the officers 
demonstrated through an even tone of voice and stiff body language that they refused to 
acknowledge the citizen’s dissatisfaction. In other cases, the citizen’s defiance required 
an active verbal response from an officer, to include a reiteration of commands or an 
expression of authority or dominance on the part of an officer. 
The interactions coded as having a degree of compliance of level 1 included all 
interactions in which citizens continued their defiance and disrespect in the face of officer 
verbal responses. These citizens were aggressive in speech and body posture and evoked 
shows of force by officers, including calls for backup and aggressive tones of voice and 
body posture. The distribution of primary citizen degree of compliance is not normally 
distributed, but rather is skewed strongly to the right. 
Independent Variables 
Social Interactionism 
Normative Independent Variables 
The social interactionist perspective suggests two types of variables which effect 
citizen voluntary compliance. The first type, normative variables, are those related to a 
citizen’s tendency to conform because of a culturally standard set of behaviors expected 
in certain situations. The first of these variables is the level of respect that an officer 
shows a citizen. In the majority of interactions, officers demonstrated general respect 
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and/or used titles of respect when addressing a citizen (sir/ma’am, Mr./Mrs.). This 
contrasts with only 9.5% of interactions where officers demonstrated disrespect for a 
citizen. It should be noted, however, that the use of titles was not an exact proxy for 
respect.  
Another normative factor suggested by social interactionism is the manner of 
initiation of the interaction. Data reveal that 70.5% of the interactions were initiated by an 
officer while 12.5% of interactions were initiated by some third party request for law 
enforcement. Also, the normative factor of whether or not a citizen has some kind of 
prior involvement with law enforcement was recorded. However, I found only 9% of 
sampled interactions contained any indication that the citizen involved was known by the 
officer prior to the interaction. This lack of variation rendered this variable useless. 
With regard to the normative variables of evidence strength and interaction 
location, I found that more often than not, at least some evidence of criminal conduct on 
the part of the citizen was apparent, though the amount of evidence varied (see Table 5). 
The majority of interactions, 67.5%, occurred on a street or highway. This reinforces the 
fact that the nature of the data source tends to over-represent traffic-enforcement related 
law enforcement activities.  
 
Table 5 
Evidence Strength 
Evidence 
Strength 
 
No Evidence 
 
28.0% 
(56) 
One Item of 
Evidence 
 
30.5% 
(61) 
Two Items  
of Evidence 
 
35.5% 
(71) 
Three Items  
of Evidence 
 
6.0% 
(12) 
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Prior research into social interactionism has considered the law enforcement skill 
level of officers to be a normative factor which could have an effect on citizen’s level of 
compliance. Due to the data source, I was unable to determine factors such as an officer’s 
years of experience in order to make an estimation of officer skill level. However, as a 
proxy for this variable, I did record whether or not an officer utilized the law enforcement 
communications technique of verbal judo. This highly structured method of officer 
communication currently is widely taught throughout American law enforcement. I found 
that in only 11 interactions did an officer use verbal judo. Once again, the lack of 
variation in this variable thwarted attempts to measure its effect on citizen voluntary 
compliance.  
Instrumental Independent Variables 
In addition to suggesting normative variables that affect citizen voluntary 
compliance, the social interactionism perspective also suggests instrumental variables. 
Instrumental variables are those factors which affect a citizen’s likelihood of voluntary 
compliance as the decision to comply is effected by a desire to avoid adverse 
consequences. Social interactionsim suggests that the decision making process of a 
citizen in an interaction with an officer is affected by both a citizen’s ability to make 
rational decisions as well as the seriousness of the conduct under investigation.  
In 18.5% of interactions, a primary citizen was at least slightly impaired as 
determined by citizen statements concerning drug/alcohol use, officer statements 
concerning odor of alcohol, citizen’s steadiness on their feet, and citizen’s slurring of 
speech (see Table 6). Only two interactions involved primary citizens who were visibly 
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mentally ill or mentally handicapped. The mental illness of the primary citizens in the 
two cases was revealed through statements made by the citizens themselves. In 9.5% of 
interactions, the citizen was notably emotional. Further, 11% of interactions involved a 
primary citizen who was less than fluent in English, thus creating some degree of 
communication difficulty during the interaction. Obviously, an individual’s language 
proficiency does not indicate impairment in the ability to make cost-benefit analyses. 
However, a language barrier does decrease the likelihood that a citizen will understand 
the information being communicated by the officer, and thus they may be deprived of 
necessary data for making an accurate cost-benefit assessment. 
 
Table 6 
Citizen Impairment 
Citizen 
Impairment 
None 
80.5% 
(161) 
Slight 
4.0% 
(8) 
Moderate 
9.0% 
(18) 
High 
5.5% 
(11) 
Unknown 
1.0% 
(1) 
 
Finally, social interactionism suggests one final instrumental variable which can 
affect citizen’s decisions regarding voluntary compliance, which is how serious the 
problem under investigation is. As shown on Figure 1, the vast majority of offenses 
(70%) are traffic related with only three interactions featur ing criminal activity that could 
be described as serious. 
Judgmental Heuristics 
The second theoretical perspective that informs this study is judgmental 
heuristics. This perspective suggests that an individual’s decision regarding compliance 
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can be impacted by several different reflexive cognitive functions, which are triggered by 
different situational stimuli. For example, judgmental heuristics suggests that individuals 
will be more likely to comply with the orders of those who exhibit signs of having a 
higher level of authority, for example those wearing police uniforms. Patrol deputies, and 
thus the officers who would have dash-cams in their vehicle, almost always are required 
to wear uniforms. However, most agencies differentiate between a more formal dress 
uniform (class A) and a less formal, more functional/comfortable uniform (class B). I 
found that interactions were almost equally likely to feature officers with class A 
uniforms as officers with class B uniforms. I also noted that in the vast majority of 
interactions (97%), whether in class A or class B uniforms, officer uniforms appeared 
tidy and neat. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Problems Being Investigated In Compliance Interactions 
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Another obvious indication of authority is officer rank. Typically higher-ranking 
officers in police departments perform administrative tasks and do not conduct patrol 
functions. Further, patrol sergeants, who function as shift supervisors, and patrol officers 
are usually the only officers to have dashboard-mounted cameras in their vehicles. 
Sergeants have three gold stripes on the sleeves of their uniforms and thus are easily 
observable. Some departments also have a rank just below Sergeant called Corporal, 
which is marked by two stripes on the sleeves of the uniform. I observed no officers with 
Corporal stripes. A Sergeant was the primary officer in 14% of interactions, with patrol 
officers with no rank making up the rest of the primary officers in the interactions. 
In addition to uniform, authority level can be revealed through a demonstration of 
knowledge. I attempted to note this variable by recording whether or not officers in an 
interaction demonstrated an advanced degree of knowledge of the legal system. 
Knowledge could be demonstrated through a discussion of the criminal code with the 
primary citizen, or information being imparted concerning the processes of the criminal 
courts. However, I found that in only 16 interactions did an officer demonstrate any 
superior knowledge of the legal system beyond basic instructions following a citation.  
Officers also can reinforce their authority by informing citizens of the agency they 
represent, therefore linking their personal authority to a broader organization. I found that 
officer’s used this method of reinforcement in only 7.5% of interactions. It also is logical 
to assume that the use of blue lights and sirens reinforces the authority of police officers, 
as these devices only may be used by law enforcement officers. I found that 76.5% of 
interactions contained examples of officers having activated their blue lights. This is to be 
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expected as the majority of interactions were traffic-related, and officers usually are 
required by policy to activate their blue lights in order to make a traffic stop. However, in 
only six interactions officers also activated their sirens.  
According to judgmental heuristics, the authority of an officer should increase if 
the citizen is informed of a legitimate reason for the officer to have initiated an 
interaction. I found that in 76.5% of interactions the officer informed the citizen of the 
crime/conduct under investigation.  
Judgmental heuristics suggests that individuals are much more likely to comply 
with a request or order if they believe that they are in some way indebted to the 
individual making the request. In other words, if an officer does some sort of favor for a 
citizen, the citizen will be more likely to reciprocate by complying with commands. I 
recorded whether or not officers in an interaction provided the citizen in the interaction 
with any form of assistance or service. I found that a variety of possible services were 
possible, including: notifying citizens of a mechanical problem with their vehicle, giving 
citizens navigational instructions, giving citizens advice about what to do at their court 
date, and reducing charges against a citizen during the interaction.  
In 48.5% of interactions, officers offered some form of assistance to the citizen 
involved. I also noted that in 16.5% of interactions the officer made a concession at the 
request of the citizen. Usually these requests involved small favors such as being allowed 
to smoke or being allowed to sit down.  
The perspective of judgmental heuristics suggests that individuals often make 
choices to behave in ways that are consistent with their prior behavior, without fully 
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considering the decision. In order to study this influence, I recorded if citizens were given 
an initial command by the primary officer. These initial commands usually took the form 
of requests for identification. I then recorded whether or not citizens complied with these 
initial commands. According to judgmental heuristics, citizens who complied with an 
initial command, thus marking themselves as a compliant individual, then would be more 
likely to comply with officer commands throughout the interaction. I found that in 85.5% 
of interactions, the citizen complied with the initial command of an officer. 
 
Table 7 
Number of Secondary Officers/Citizens 
Number of 
Secondary 
Officers 
0 1 2 3-5 >5 
54% 28.50% 13.00% 4.50% 0.00% 
108 57 26 9 0 
Number of 
Secondary 
Citizens  
0 1 2 3-5 >5 
55.50% 25.00% 12.50% 5.50% 4.50% 
111 50 25 11 9 
 
According to judgmental heuristics, two additional variables may affect the 
likelihood of compliance. The first is conformity. Citizens tend to behave in the same 
manner as those around them. Table 7 shows that in the majority of interactions, no 
additional citizens or officers were present. However, in interactions where a secondary 
officer or citizen was present, the compliance of the additional person was measured. 
Secondary citizens and secondary officers complied with the commands of the primary 
officers in the vast majority of interactions where they were present. 
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The last judgmental heuristic suggested by the literature is that of “liking.” 
Citizens will be more likely to comply with the commands of an officer they like. This is 
an extremely difficult variable to measure. However, I did record whether or not officers 
advocated leniency for a citizen in the presence of the citizen, reasoning that an 
articulation of mercy by officers would create fondness in the mind of the citizen. I found 
that in only 7% of interactions was any such articulation in favor of leniency made by an 
officer. 
Additional Independent Variables 
In addition to the variables suggested by social interactionism and judgmental 
heuristics, I measured several additional variables. I measured the socio-economic status 
of the citizens involved in the interactions by relying on a “best guess” as to the monetary 
value of the vehicle occupied by the primary citizen. The research revealed that 17% of 
sampled interactions contained citizens occupying vehicles of low monetary value and 
that 29.5% and 25% of interactions contained citizens occupying medium-low and 
medium value vehicles, respectively. This accounts for the majority of interactions. 
However, 35 interactions (17.5%) involved citizens who were not occupying a vehicle at 
all.  
I also recorded the level of respect shown by citizens toward officers. I found that 
in the plurality of interactions, 44.5%, both parties showed respect for one another. 
However, I did find that in cases where officers were disrespectful towards citizens (9.5% 
of interactions), citizens were either respectful or neutral in over 2/3 of the interactions. 
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I also recorded a few other independent variables. I found that interactions were 
approximately as likely to have occurred during the day as during the night. I also found 
that in only three interactions did an officer ever notify a citizen that the interaction was 
being recorded.  
Results of Ordinal Logistic Regression 
Each of the independent variables hypothesized to have an effect upon a citizen’s 
likelihood of compliance was analyzed using ordinal logistic regression utilizing SPSS. I 
first assessed the overall model fit for each of the cumulative odds models created to 
compare the effect of each independent variable upon the likelihood of a specific degree 
of primary citizen’s compliance (see Table 8). 
As Table 8 demonstrates, this analysis found only eight independent variables 
with a significant relationship with citizen voluntary compliance. For example, the 
significance level for the model fit for the independent variable of interaction location is 
small (p<.05). This means that I reject the null hypothesis that the location coefficients 
for all of the variables in the model are zero. In other words, I reject the null hypothesis 
that the model without the predictor of location is as good as the model with the 
predictor. Therefore, the independent variable of location provides significant predictive 
power for citizen compliance. As Table 8 also shows, the citizen’s level of impairment, 
the citizen’s emotional state, the manner of initiation of the interaction, the officer’s use 
of threats, the citizen’s initial compliance, the officer’s demonstration of respect for the 
citizen, and the police department of the primary officer all proved to have significant 
predictive power for citizen compliance. 
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Table 8 
Overall Model Test 
 
  Chi-Square Sig. 
      
Evidence strength 1.844 0.605 
Location 6.506 0.039* 
Primary officer rank 0.935 0.334 
Verbal judo 1.593 0.207 
Citizen non-white  1.509 0.219 
Citizen gender 1.106 0.293 
Problem seriousness 5.25 0.154 
Citizen intoxication 9.392 0.025* 
Citizen mental illness/handicap 0.064 0.801 
Citizen emotion 20.553 0.000*** 
Officer legal expertise 3.614 0.057 
Officer uniform tidiness 0.256 0.613 
Officer advocates for citizen 0.01 0.921 
Primary citizen age 4.209 0.24 
Citizen/officer physical build 6.09 0.107 
Primary citizen English fluency 0.018 0.894 
Value of primary citizen’s vehicle  4.195 0.38 
Number of secondary citizen vs. officers 4.411 0.11 
Interaction initiation 4.727 0.03* 
Officer threats 5.179 0.023* 
Citizen notified of recording 1.29 0.256 
Officer wearing class A uniform 2.1 0.147 
Officer provides service 0.273 0.601 
Officer reduces charges 0.039 0.842 
Citizen compliance with initial command 10.909 0.001** 
Secondary citizen compliance 0.835 0.361 
Secondary officer compliance 1.509 0.219 
Primary officer age 0.022 0.882 
Officer respect 11.194 0.004** 
Officer prior knowledge of citizen 1.798 0.18 
Police Department (King PD vs. Kernersville PD) 9.293 0.002** 
 
(*= p<.05)       (**= p<.01)                (*= p<.000)  
The relationships between the remaining independent variables and the dependent 
variable of citizen compliance are not significant, and thus the predictive value for citizen 
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compliance provided by the other independent variables is not powerful, and they are 
removed from the model. 
Table 9 highlights the significance of the variance between different categories of 
the individual independent variables. The significance level demonstrates the probability 
that the observed variance in the dependent variable can be attributed to chance. The 
coefficient indicates the direction of the variation in the dependent variable as caused by 
the independent variable. “A positive coefficient tells you that as the value of the 
(independent) variable increases, the likelihood of larger (dependent va riable) scores 
increases” (Norušis 2007:71). 
 At this point, it is appropriate to state that due to the small sample size of this 
study, and the nature of ordinal logistic regression, validity issues do arise as the sample 
is divided into smaller and smaller groups. As already has been discussed, ordinal logistic 
regression operates by comparing all cases in which one category of an independent 
variable was present to all those in which that category was not present. The model 
continues by taking all the remaining cases and measuring the next category of the 
independent variable compared to all remaining cases that did not have this category and 
so on and so forth.  
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Table 9 
Parameter Estimates 
 
    Estimated   Sig 
   Coefficient   
Interaction Location Street/highway 0.752   0.079 
  PVA -0.076   0.877 
  Private property 0(a)    
        
Citizen Impairment None 0.948   0.101 
  Slight 21.603   0.000 
  Moderate 1.044   0.16 
  High 0(a)    
        
Citizen Emotion Not emotional 2.256   0.000*** 
  Notably emotional 0(a)    
        
Initiation of Interaction Not initiated by officer -0.693   0.026* 
  Initiated by officer 0(a)    
        
Officer Uses Threat No Threat -2.331   0.005** 
  Threat 0(a)    
        
Citizen Initial 
Compliance No initial compliance -2.691   0.001** 
  Initial compliance 0(a)    
        
Officer Respect Disrespect -1.568   0.001** 
  Neutral -0.348   0.287 
  Respect 0(a)    
        
Police Department King 1.19   0.006** 
  Kernersville 0(a)    
          
 
(*= p<.05)       (**= p<.01)                (*= p<.000) 
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This difficulty is exacerbated when the independent variable whose effect we are 
measuring has a greater number of categories. For example, the independent variable of 
citizen level of intoxication has four separate categories. Therefore, the likelihood is 
higher that no cases involve a citizen who is non-compliant and also at a specific level of 
impairment. At this point, SPSS gives a warning concerning validity. In the case of the 
independent variable of citizen impairment, SPSS gives the warning of 4 cells with zero 
frequencies, which does create some uncertainty in the validity of this analysis. It is due 
to this fact that I did not conduct any analysis of the dependent variable of citizen 
voluntary compliance with officer commands, with multiple independent variables 
simultaneously. 
Based on these parameter estimates, location and impairment are no longer 
significant. In other words, though these two variables appeared to have some 
relationship with citizen compliance, further analysis reveals that the connection failed to 
provide predictive value. It also should be mentioned that I analyzed citizen impairment 
again after compressing it into a bivariate variable (some impairment vs. no impairment). 
However, this did not alter the outcome that citizen impairment still did not show a 
significant effect, positive or negative, upon citizen compliance.  
This technique only can give valid results if enough variation exists between 
categories of the dependent variable so that each category of a given independent variable 
has cases corresponding to each of the categories of the dependent variable. As has 
already been mentioned, due to the lack of overall variation in the dependent variable of 
citizen degree of compliance, I collapsed the variable from a range of 1-10 to a range of 
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1-4. This insured that each of the categories of citizen degree of compliance would have a 
greater number of cases while at the same time preserving the usefulness of a more 
nuanced measure of citizen compliance. However, despite this precaution, the analysis is 
still hampered by the lack of examples of cases in which citizens were more non-
compliant with officer commands.  
  The effect of the independent variable of citizen emotion is significant at the .05 
level. The coefficient for interactions in which citizens were not emotional is positive, 
indicating that in interactions where citizens were more emotional, they also were more 
likely to be compliant with officer commands. This result is contrary to the Mastrofski et 
al. (1996) findings. 
 The effect of the independent variable of interaction initiation also is significant at 
the .05 level. The coefficient for interactions that were not initiated by officers was 
negative, indicating that if an interaction was initiated by an officer, the citizen was less 
compliant. This supports the research hypothesis that citizens are more likely to be 
compliant when an interaction is initiated by someone other than an officer. 
 The effect of the independent variable of officer use of threats is significant at the 
.05 level. The coefficient for interactions in which officers did not threaten citizens was 
negative, indicating that if an officer threatened a citizen, the citizen was less compliant. 
This evidence supports the research hypothesis that citizens are more likely to be 
compliant with officer commands in non-threatening interactions with officers. We can 
say with confidence that citizens are more likely to be more compliant with officer 
commands if the officer does not threaten the citizen.  
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  The effect of the independent variable of citizen initial compliance is significant 
at the .05 level. The coefficient for interactions in which citizens did not comply with 
initial commands was negative. This is somewhat counterintuitive in that it appears that 
citizens who comply with the initial commands of an officer actually are less compliant 
over the course of the interaction. This does not support the research hypothesis that 
citizens are more likely to remain compliant after they have been compliant with the 
officer’s initial commands. However, it should be noted that in only six cases did the 
primary citizen fail to comply with an officer’s initial commands, creating validity 
concerns. 
The effect of the independent variable of officer respect is significant at the .05 
level. The coefficient for interactions in which officers demonstrate disrespect for citizens 
was negative, indicating that officers who showed disrespect for a citizen obtained more 
compliance on the part of the primary citizen in return. This does not support the research 
hypothesis that citizens are more likely to be compliant when officers demonstrate 
respect for citizens. Once again, however, the number of relevant cases is small. In only 
19 cases did officers demonstrate disrespect for citizens. Therefore, rather than 
suggesting that officers who demonstrate disrespect get greater levels of citizen 
compliance, this suggests that citizen’s are still likely to comply, even in interactions in 
which officers are disrespectful.  
Finally, I examined the effect of the independent variable of the departmental 
affiliation of the primary officer. I analyzed a small sample of footage from the King 
Police Department in order to investigate the extent to which the findings at Kernersville 
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might be applicable to officer/citizen interactions outside of Kernersville. I hypothesized 
that compliance would be virtually the same regardless of the agency in which the 
officers are located. However, the effect of the independent variable of police department 
is significant at the .05 level. The coefficient for interactions which involved King police 
officers was positive, indicating that in interactions initiated by Kernersville officers, 
more compliance was shown by primary citizens. In other words, no evidence supports 
the research hypothesis that citizens are equally likely to comply with the commands of 
King and Kernersville police officers. I cannot speculate as to the full implications of this 
finding, given that only 50 cases were sampled in King. However, this finding does 
suggest the need for further research into the effect of law enforcement agencies or 
jurisdictions upon citizen voluntary compliance. 
 Overall, I found mixed results for the hypotheses suggested by the literature. It is 
clear that only a small number of independent variables expected to affect citizen 
compliance actually had a statistically significant relationship with the dependent 
variable. Of those six variables which did have a significant relationship to voluntary 
compliance, only the independent variables of officer use of threats and the initiation of 
the interaction were shown to affect citizen voluntary compliance as hypothesized. The 
rest of the variables demonstrated relationships opposite of those hypothesized: citizens 
likelihood of compliance is different in interactions involving a King PD officer than in 
interactions involving a Kernersville PD officer, citizens are less (not more) compliant 
when they are calm, when they comply with initial commands, and when officers show 
them more respect. These results will be addressed further in the discussion.  
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CHAPTER VI 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 
A discussion of this research requires a look back at the previously stated goal of 
this study. The goal of this research is to ascertain factors that influence the likelihood of 
citizen voluntary compliance to the verbal commands of a law enforcement officer during 
an encounter. Thus, the research is guided by the following questions: 
1. What traits and/or behaviors, if any, on the part of the primary citizen affect, 
positively or negatively, the likelihood of his/her voluntary compliance with officer 
commands? 
2. What traits and/or behaviors, if any, on the part of the primary officer affect, 
positively or negatively, the likelihood of the primary citizen voluntarily complying with 
officer commands? 
3. What, if any, situational factors affect a citizen’s likelihood of voluntary 
compliance to officer commands during a compliance interaction?  
4. Does the presence, absence, or behavior of secondary officers and/or citizens 
affect, positively or negatively, the likelihood of the primary citizen voluntarily 
complying with officer commands? 
Quantitative Factors  
Overall, the research revealed eight factors impacting on the vo luntary 
compliance of a citizen to officer commands: the location of the interaction, the citizen’s 
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level of impairment, the citizen’s level of emotionality, the manner of initiation of the 
interaction, the officer’s use of threats directed at the citizen, the citizen’s compliance to 
the initial commands of an officer, an officer’s demonstration of respect towards a 
citizen, and finally, the law enforcement agency of the officer. However, further 
investigation revealed that neither the location of the interaction nor the citizen’s level of 
impairment could be linked to either an increase or decrease in the level of voluntary 
compliance of citizens.  
Thus, six factors prove to influence the likelihood of citizen voluntary compliance 
to officer commands. None of these six factors are related to the traits of the primary 
citizens involved in the interactions as posited in research question 1. Factors such as 
citizen race, sex, physical build and socio-economic status all fail to display any affect 
upon the likelihood of voluntary compliance. The theory of social interactionism suggests 
that citizen’s comply with officer commands to the degree that they feel bonded to 
society. “There is a widespread expectation, with some evidentiary support, that the poor, 
the unemployed, racial minorities, youths and males are predisposed to noncompliance 
because of prior unhappy experience or the perception that others like them are treated 
badly” (Mastrofski et al. 1996:278). This study reveals no such predisposition. The 
Mastrofski et al. research also found that “poor citizens are significantly less likely to be 
compliant, but males and minorities citizens are more likely to show compliance” 
(Mastrofski et al. 1996:289). However, our research reveals no support for these findings.  
Only two citizen behaviors affect the citizen’s likelihood of voluntary 
compliance. First, in cases where the citizen complied with the initial command of the 
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officer, the citizen was less compliant overall. The theory of judgmental heuristics 
suggests that individuals attempt to take courses of action which make them appear 
consistent with prior statements or behaviors. The reason for the contrary findings is 
unclear. What does seem to be apparent is that no simple causal relationship exists 
between a citizen’s decision to comply with the first command of an officer and future 
decisions regarding compliance to commands.  
Second, citizen’s emotionality also affects citizen’s likelihood of compliance. The 
theory of social interactionism suggests that a citizen’s emotionality is an instrumental 
factor which influences citizen compliance. The Mastrofski et al. (1996) study found that 
emotionality, along with intoxication, made citizens irrational, and that “higher levels of 
irrationality are associated with lower levels of compliance” (Mastrofski et al. 1996:295). 
However, the findings here reveal that citizens who demonstrate high levels of emotion 
are more likely to comply with officer commands. This runs contrary to both prior 
research as well as convent ional wisdom. One possible explanation for this is that the 
Mastrofski et al. (1996) study treated emotionality as a sign of irrationality. However, 
emotionality also may make citizens more amenable to officer commands and more 
flexible in their potential responses. Ethnographic notes on those exchanges reveal that as 
the interaction develops, officers adjust their tactics and responses to the actions and 
responses of the citizen, including their level of emotion, and vice versa. This dynamic 
exchange reveals a negotiation process through which compliance is eventually obtained.  
In regards to the second question guiding this study, analysis reveals that the 
influence of officer demographics on citizen compliance could not be assessed. As 
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previously mentioned, all officers encountered in this research were white, non-Hispanic 
and almost entirely male. The homogeneity of officers prevents any meaningful 
assessment of the effect of officer demographics on a citizen’s likelihood of compliance. 
The Mastrofski et al. (1996) study found that white officers dealing with minority citizens 
were significantly more likely to get compliant responses than were all other pairings 
(Mastrofski et al. 1996:289). However, due to our lack of variation in the race of the 
officers, this factor could not be assessed.  
The only officer trait to have an effect upon citizen likelihood of compliance is 
related to departmental affiliation. Citizens were more likely to fully comply with the 
commands of officers from the Kernersville Police Department when compared to 
officers of the King Police Department. As will be discussed at length later in this 
section, this result is somewhat questionable due to the fact that the samples taken at the 
two agencies were of different sizes. Further, the fact that officers of the two departments 
were engaged in interactions within two different communities also raises the question as 
to whether the officers of a given department are less likely to elicit voluntary compliance 
from citizens, or whether citizens of a given city are less likely to comply with the 
commands of an officer. The variable of officer department affiliation does, in many 
ways, transcend the label of “officer trait.” However, significant variation remains 
between the levels of compliance obtained by King police officers and Kernersville 
police officers. These findings indicate that conducting an investigation into citizen 
compliance involving only one law enforcement agency, as was done by the Mastrofski 
et al. (1996) study, may produce results which are not generalizable to officer/citizen 
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compliance interactions outside of the jurisdiction involved. The issue of variation 
between departments/jurisdictions must be explored further.  
Two officer behaviors were shown to have an effect upon the likelihood of citizen 
compliance. Officers who made threats against a citizen were less likely to elicit 
voluntary compliance from the citizen. This finding supports the hypothesis that officers 
will be more likely to obtain compliance when they use means other than threats. The 
Mastrofski et al. (1996) study proposed that “the more authoritative (threatening) the 
police intervention, the greater the threat to identity, which raises the likelihood of citizen 
resistance” (Mastrofski et al. 1996:275). The Mastrofski et al. study did find that officers 
who used a friendly approach, rather than a threatening one, were “significantly more 
likely to produce a compliant response” (1996:290).  
Though this particular finding does support the results of prior research, the 
finding must still be questioned. The method of recording an officer’s use of threats, 
utilized by both the current study and its predecessors, does not allow for a nuanced 
understanding of the progression of the interaction. Once again it is difficult to consider 
the behavior of one actor, in this case the officer, as being truly independent from the 
behaviors of the other actor in the interaction. It is possible, as Mastrofski et al. (1996) 
theorize, that officer threats do create a situation where citizens feel compelled to be 
more resistant and less compliant. However, it also is possible that officers are more 
likely to issue threats in situations where the citizen has indicated that they already are 
resistant and noncompliant. Once again, the dynamic nature of the officer/citizen 
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compliance interaction prevents firm statements regarding the direction of causality, even 
when results appear to support the hypothesis.  
The second police behavior to demonstrate a relationship to citizen compliance is 
officer’s display of respect. The Mastrofski et al. study hypothesized that citizens would 
be more likely to comply when officers demonstrated respect towards the citizen. Social 
interactionism suggests that an officer’s show of respect increases officer legitimacy and 
thus compliance. Mastrofski et al. found that “when the state’s agents do things that 
undercut their legitimacy (show disrespect), compliance becomes problematic” 
(Mastrofski et al. 1996:296). The results of our study show that officers who demonstrate 
a lower level of respect for the citizen are more likely to elicit full compliance from that 
citizen.  
This finding runs contrary to both prior research as well as conventional wisdom. 
However, once again, the question of causality rises to the surface. Our research, guided 
by the literature into compliance, was designed to view citizen compliance as an 
outcome, rather than as a process. As will be discussed at length later, the qualitative 
documentation regarding the officer/citizen compliance interactions reveals a much more 
dynamic exchange than could be adequately captured by quantitative measures of 
compliance. As officers and citizens act and react in an attempt to carry out a social 
interaction, the causal direction of the respect/compliance relationship is obscured. It is 
possible that a citizen’s initial lack of compliance may trigger a display of dominance on 
the part of the officer in the interaction which involves a display of disrespect towards the 
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citizen. Perhaps it is the negotiation of dominance which produces a greater degree of 
compliance on the part of the citizen.  
Clearly the relationship between officer dominance and citizen compliance is 
complicated. An officer’s use of threats, which would appear to be an obvious display of 
dominance, produces less compliance while an officer’s display of disrespect produces a 
greater degree of compliance. Achieving dominance over a citizen, and thus obtaining 
his/her compliance, may be dependent upon an officer’s use of nuanced interpersonal 
communication. It is possible that issuing threats is an obtuse attempt at expressing 
dominance which serves to undermine the authority of the individual issuing the threats. 
Conversely, showing disrespect for another individual in an interaction may be a more 
subtle expression of dominance and therefore a more effective means of encouraging 
compliance. However, quantitative analysis does not reveal the intricacies of dominance 
negotiation within these interactions. 
The third question guiding the research relates to the affect of situational factors 
upon a citizen’s likelihood of compliance. The only situational factor shown to affect 
citizen compliance to officer commands is the manner of initiation of the interaction. The 
Mastrofski et al. (1996) study hypothesized that citizens would be more compliant in 
interactions initiated by citizens than officers, because responding to a call for service 
would be seen as more legitimate. However, the Mastrofski et al. study did not find 
significant evidence of a relationship between interaction initiation and citizen 
compliance. The current study did find that in cases where interactions were initiated by 
officers, the citizen was less likely to fully comply. This finding supports the hypothesis 
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and lends credence to the claim of social interactionism that the normative factor of 
legitimacy affects citizen compliance. 
The initiation of the interaction is a situational factor, and thus, is not influenced 
by the behavioral dynamics of the interaction. Thus concerns over causality voiced to this 
point are not as relevant. The manner of initiation of the interaction is more of a truly 
independent variable, and thus the finding that officer initiated interactions produce less 
compliance carries more weight than some of the other findings of this study. However, it 
also is important to point out the degree to which this sample has been skewed towards 
officer initiated interactions. The vast majority of interactions viewed through dashboard 
mounted video footage are related to some form of traffic enforcement. Thus, it is 
probable that citizen initiated encounters are severely underrepresented in this sample 
because such interactions usually take place in a home or business, out of view of the 
video system.  
This study also examined the possible effect of the presence, absence, or behavior 
of multiple officers and/or citizens on the primary citizen’s likelihood of compliance. 
Social interactionism suggests that the instrumental factor of number of officers relative 
to citizens in an interaction is incorporated into the citizen’s cost/benefit analysis 
regarding a decision to comply. Citizens will be more likely to comply to the degree they 
are outnumbered by officers. However, the Mastrofski et al. study found “that the number 
of officers present decreases the probability of compliance” (1996:295). This research 
reveals that the presence of secondary citizens or secondary officers does not appear to 
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affect, positively or negatively, the likelihood of voluntary compliance of a primary 
citizen.  
The findings of this research reveal that voluntary compliance is impacted by an 
array of factors related to the participants and the situation. Interestingly, the majority of 
factors found to affect citizen compliance demonstrate directionality contrary to those 
hypothesized. Only the manner of initiation of the interaction and the officer’s use of 
threats affects citizen’s likelihood of compliance as expected. Citizen’s emotionality, 
citizen’s initial compliance to commands, officer respect, and the department of the 
primary officer all demonstrate relationships to citizen voluntary compliance opposite of 
those hypothesized. Further, twenty-five additional factors investigated and hypothesized 
to influence citizen compliance reveal no affect upon a citizen’s likelihood of 
compliance. What can be discerned from these findings? 
First, the findings suggest that situational factors, in general, are not influential on 
citizen voluntary compliance. The only situational factor shown to affect citizen 
compliance is the manner of initiation of the interaction. Second, the traits of those 
involved also are rarely influential on citizen compliance. Only one officer trait, 
departmental affiliation, had an effect on citizen compliance. Finally, the behaviors of the 
actors involved had the most influence upon compliance. Two citizen behaviors 
demonstrated an effect upon citizen compliance-citizen initial compliance to officer 
commands and citizen emotionality-and two officer behaviors also had an effect upon 
citizen compliance-officer demonstration of respect and officer use of threats.  
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Of the six influential factors, only two, the department of the officer and the 
manner of initiation, are truly independent of the dynamics of the compliance interaction 
itself. Citizen emotion, citizen initial compliance, officer demonstration of respect, and 
officer use of threats all are influenced by the interaction between officers and citizens.  
Prior research into officer/citizen compliance interactions has viewed citizen 
compliance as a binary outcome, with the interaction leading to compliance or 
noncompliance. In this research, I also measured compliance as a bivariate variable; 
however, I also attempted to provide a more nuanced assessment of compliance by using 
a compliance scale, ranging from complete voluntary compliance to complete failure to 
voluntarily comply. While this measure did provide for a richer understanding of citizen 
voluntary compliance, it still classified the compliance as the outcome of the interaction, 
in the same way that a figure skater’s score is the outcome of his/her performance.  
 However, as I viewed the footage of the interactions, I came to understand that a 
citizen’s compliance fluctuates throughout the interaction. In cases where the citizen was 
coded as exhibiting full voluntary compliance, the citizen maintained the same level of 
deference, submission and compliance throughout the interaction. However, in the sixty-
eight cases where citizens were less than fully compliant, the compliance behavior of the 
citizen was not static. Defiance and noncompliance were expressed by the citizen, to 
varying degrees. These behaviors influenced officers, who reacted in one way or another 
to these behaviors. The officer’s actions then produced reactions by the citizens, which, 
combined with situational factors, led to an exacerbation or mitigation of the initial 
noncompliance. 
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Neither of the measures of compliance used in this study, or any other, fully 
recognizes nor accounts for this process of negotiation. Additionally, several of the 
factors that significantly influence citizen compliance are themselves negotiations. The 
respect that an officer demonstrates for a citizen is subject to the same forces of action 
and reaction as compliance. In such a dynamic process, it is difficult, if not impossible to 
separate, in a quantitative way the influence officer respect has upon citizen compliance 
from the influence citizen compliance has on officer respect. 
 Having discussed the overall results of the research with relation to the four 
research questions, it also is important to assess how each of the six factors shown to 
affect citizen compliance fit into the theoretical perspectives which guide and inform this 
research. The research hypotheses suggested by the literature found mixed predictive 
success in this study. Several of the hypotheses suggested by social interaction theory, as 
well as some of those put forth by the theory of judgmental heuristics, fail to be 
supported by the data. However, the fact that support for the hypotheses suggested by the 
literature is mixed does not indicate that the underlying theories are necessarily flawed. 
Rather, an in-depth discussion of the relationship between the sample, the resulting data, 
and the research hypotheses is indicated. 
Social Interactionism 
 Social interactionism utilizes three principles in order to examine aggression or 
compliance interactions: rational choice of actors, situational factors, and phenomenology 
(the cognitive tendencies/biases) of the actors. Social interactionism sets forth two types 
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of independent variables theorized to affect citizen voluntary compliance—normative 
factors and instrumental factors. 
 Normative factors are those involving the tendency of a citizen to conform 
because of a culturally standard set of behaviors expected in certain situations. The theory 
of social interactionism suggests several normative independent variables to have an 
influence upon a citizen’s likelihood of voluntary compliance; however, only three 
normative variables were shown to have an influence on a citizen’s likelihood of 
compliance: officer demonstration of respect, initiation of the interaction, and officer use 
of threats. 
 Social interactionism suggests that individuals are more likely to conform to 
social norms to the extent that they feel those norms are legitimate. In the case of 
officer/citizen compliance interactions, social interactionists hypothesize that citizens are 
more likely to comply with the commands of officers they perceive as being more 
legitimate.  
However, a citizen’s subjective evaluation of an officer’s legitimacy is 
exceedingly difficult to measure. Perceptions of legitimacy can be heavily affected by a 
citizen’s upbringing and prior experience with law enforcement, neither of which can be 
measured by observing dash cam footage. It also should be noticed that officers utilize 
ubiquitous indications of legitimacy. Police uniforms, badges, and patrol cars all 
reinforce the official and legitimate authority of officers; however, due to the 
omnipresence of these tokens of legitimacy, it is difficult to evaluate their effect upon 
citizen compliance.  
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An officer’s demonstration of respect for a citizen is hypothesized to be one 
measure of the legitimacy of the officer. Social interactionism theorizes that officer’s 
who show respect for a citizen are perceived as being more legitimate and thus the citizen 
will be more likely to comply. Mastrofski et al. (1996:296) found that “officers who 
showed disrespect to the targeted citizen were strikingly less likely to obtain 
compliance.” However, the analysis here does not support this finding, but instead finds a 
higher level of compliance in cases where the officer demonstrates disrespect towards 
citizens. It is unclear as to why this counterintuitive result appears. It is possible that 
disrespect shown by an officer is perceived by the citizen as a form of dominance, and 
that such a display serves to intimidate citizens into submission and consequently 
compliance. 
The normative factor of officer use of threats is closely related to officer 
demonstration of respect. Social interactionism theorizes that officers who make threats 
against a citizen are less likely to elicit voluntary compliance from the citizen. These 
findings supports this hypothesis. The Mastrofski et al. study proposed that “the more 
authoritative (threatening) the police intervention, the greater the threat to identity, which 
raises the likelihood of citizen resistance” (Mastrofski et al. 1996:275). The Mastrofski et 
al. study did find that officers who used a friendly approach, rather than a threatening 
one, were “significantly more likely to produce a compliant response” (Mastrofski et al. 
1996:290). In the case of officer threats, even though the findings support the results of 
prior research, the findings themselves must still be questioned. It is unclear whether an 
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officer’s use of threats is a response to noncompliance or whether the threats themselves 
impel the citizen towards noncompliance.  
Another normative factor suggested by social interactionism to affect citizen 
perception of officer legitimacy and thus increase voluntary compliance revolves around 
who initiates the interaction. Mastrofski et al. (1996) hypothesized that interactions 
initiated by citizens have greater legitimacy to citizens than those initiated by law 
enforcement, resulting in higher levels of compliance. This analysis finds support for this 
hypothesis, even though the Mastrofski et al. study found no such support. This 
difference may be accounted for by a difference in method between the two studies. The 
majority of interactions sampled by this study were traffic-related, and thus officer 
initiated; however, the Mastrofski et al. study was conducted by ride-a- long researchers 
who were able to record a higher percentage of interactions prompted by 911 calls or 
citizen calls for service.  
 Social interactionism also suggests that instrumental factors affect citizen 
voluntary compliance. Instrumental factors are those related to a tendency to conform in 
order to avoid adverse consequences. In other words, citizens’ decisions to voluntarily 
comply or not are based on rational decisions to avoid both formal and informal 
sanctions. The theory of social interactionism suggests that citizens make decisions 
regarding compliance which are based on a calculation as to which course of action is 
most likely to allow them to avoid adverse consequences. In the case of officer/citizen 
compliance interactions, it is usually the case that a citizen is subject to more sanctions if 
they fail to voluntarily comply. A citizen who fails to comply can be criminally charged, 
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or the failure to comply can even be met with physical force . However, the theory 
suggests that citizens will be less capable of making this mental evaluation of 
consequences if their decision-making processes are impaired by either substance use or 
high levels of emotion.  
This research demonstrates that in cases where the citizen is noticeably emotional, 
he/she is more, rather than less, likely to comply with officer commands. These results 
fail to support the theory of social interactionism and violate conventional wisdom that 
citizens are more compliant when they are calm. These results also fail to support the 
findings of the Mastrofski et al research, which used emotionality as a proxy for 
irrationality and found that “higher levels of irrationality are associated with lower levels 
of compliance” (Mastrofski et al. 1996:295). It is interesting to note that while the 
research did reveal a relationship between a citizen being noticeably intoxicated and 
likelihood of voluntary compliance, the direction of the affect of citizen impairment upon 
compliance could not be measured.  
 Taken as a whole, the theory of social interactionism clearly does not fully 
explain variation in citizen voluntary compliance in officer/citizen compliance 
interactions. The Mastrofski et al. study found evidence of a wide range of influential 
independent variables drawn from both normative and instrumental factors suggested by 
social interactionism. However, the only factors in this study that reveal results similar to 
the Mastrofski et al. study are interaction initiation and use of officer threats. 
 The theory of social interactionism is a broad perspective, encompassing classical 
school thinking in criminology, rational choice theory and criminological control theory. 
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However, this theory provides only two independent variables which demonstrate a 
significant effect upon citizen voluntary compliance in the manner hypothesized. It is 
possible that as wide a net as is cast by social interactionsim, it still fails to fully describe 
the morphology of a developing compliance interaction.  
Judgmental Heuristics 
The theory of judgmental heuristics suggests that individuals use cognitive 
shortcuts to determine courses of action. Judgmental heuristics suggests that individuals 
have numerous triggers for these shortcuts, and thus numerous factors should affect 
citizen compliance. However, the only variable in this study taken from judgmental 
heuristics that demonstrates a measurable degree of influence upon citizen compliance is 
the level of initial compliance by citizens. Judgmental heuristics suggests that individuals 
strive to appear consistent. Therefore, a citizen who is initially compliant is more likely to 
remain compliant throughout the interaction. This is a difficult variable to measure 
because an individual’s score of their total degree of compliance includes their initial 
compliance. However, contrary to the hypothesized relationship, this analysis finds that 
citizens who comply with the initial commands of law enforcement officers have lower 
levels of compliance throughout the rest of the interaction. This result is most likely a 
result of the lack of variation of the sample, since almost all citizens complied with the 
initial commands of the officer. However, the results do demonstrate that the interaction 
is a process of compliance, where citizens’ cooperativeness ebbs and flows. The reaction 
of a citizen to an officer’s commands may be an indication of their behavior throughout 
the rest of the interaction; however, citizens’ likelihood of compliance seems to be 
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affected by the development of the interaction, resulting in citizens who start off 
compliant but who may become less compliant as the interaction plays out. 
 While an interesting perspective on the decision-making processes used by 
citizens in compliance interactions, judgmental heuristics, like social interactionism, does 
not provide a significant level of explanation of compliance. It should be noted that much 
of the research supporting the theory of judgmental heuristics is based on compliance 
experiments involving volunteers. This type of experiment places a subject in an 
abnormal situation which causes unease in the volunteer and therefore makes him/her 
more reliant on cognitive shortcuts than they might be in a more natural setting.  
As was mentioned earlier, the goal of this study is not to engage in a formal 
testing of the theories of either social interactionism or judgmental heuristics. These two 
theories have served to guide the inquiry by providing perspectives for understanding 
officer/citizen compliance interactions, and suggesting factors which may affect citizens’ 
likelihood of compliance. The theory of social interactionism provides three normative 
factors and one instrumental factor shown to affect the likelihood of complying with 
officer commands. However, the normative factors of officer use of threats and initiation 
of interaction are the only two factors which affect citizen compliance in the manner 
predicted by the theory of social interactionism. However, no factors predicted by the 
theory of judgmental heuristics have the anticipated affect on citizen compliance to 
officer commands. The results of this study lead to the conclusion that neither the theory 
of social interactionism nor the theory of judgmental heuristics adequately describes the 
full complexities of an officer/citizen compliance interaction.  
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This research makes clear that compliance interactions involve individuals who 
are engaged in a dynamic interaction and who have a variety of desires and perceptions, 
some pre-existing and some developing during the course of the interaction, all of which 
influence how they respond to officer commands. To fully understand citizen voluntary 
compliance, it is essential to understand the role that the officers, citizens, and context 
play in the developing interaction.  
Qualitative Factors  
 In addition to coding for quantitative variables, I also took notes regarding the 
quality and development of the interaction, specifically the dramatological factors at play 
in the interaction. Though not a thorough and complete ethnographic study, these notes 
do supplement the findings from the quantitative analysis. 
The officer/citizen compliance interactions that I observed contained an obvious 
undercurrent of a struggle for dominance. I made note of the fact that in almost all traffic 
stops, the officer began speaking to the citizen rather than the citizen speaking first. In 
this way, officers appeared to be using a linguistic technique of dominance assertion.  
For example, the officer would tell the citizen that he/she had been stopped for 
speeding and then would ask the citizen why they had been driving at an excessive speed. 
In cases where the officer maintained the conversational initiative, i.e., making 
statements and eliciting specific responses from the citizen, the officer appeared 
dominant and the citizen submissive. In such cases, citizens almost always were coded as 
completely compliant. However, in a minority of cases, the citizen was able to lay hold to 
the conversational initiative of the interaction.  
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In one interaction involving a female Kernersville police officer, she made a 
traffic stop and approached the driver, who was the only citizen present. The officer 
asked for the citizen’s license and registration; however, while the citizen was searching 
for these items, he asked the officer the reason for the stop. At this point, the citizen was 
eliciting a specific response from the officer, and the citizen was no longer enacting a 
submissive role. The officer attempted to regain the conversational initiative by 
responding with the question, “when did you put your seatbelt on?” thus intimating that 
the reason for the stop was that the citizen had not been wearing his seatbelt. The officer 
was seeking a specific response from the citizen that would admit criminal guilt and 
retain the dominance of the officer. The citizen responded by stating that his seat belt had 
been on the whole time he was on the road.  
At this time, the citizen’s tone of voice became assertive and his volume 
increased. The citizen appeared not only to proclaim his innocence, but at the same time 
claimed dominance of the interaction, forcing the officer to either challenge him further 
by calling him a liar or to submit to his assertion of innocence and state that she was 
mistaken. The officer at this point stated that she had not seen the citizen’s seat belt as he 
had gone past her, intimating that she could have failed to see the seatbelt, thus taking a 
conciliatory and less dominant position. The citizen again stated that he had been wearing 
the seatbelt the whole time and that the officer had just failed to see it. The citizen’s tone 
remained forceful and indignant, giving the impression that the officer had no legitimate 
reason to detain him and that he, as the dominant actor in the interaction, expected the 
traffic stop to be terminated. The officer continued to respond to the citizen’s remarks 
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and her voice took on a much more apologetic and conciliatory tone, now attempting to 
mitigate the citizen’s assertiveness and create cooperation rather than dominance.  
The interaction ended when the officer abbreviated the stop, failing to run the 
citizen’s license and registration, as is the typical tactic of Kernersville police officers. 
Instead the officer gave the citizen his license and registration directly back to him and 
ended the interaction. The officer never took a completely submissive posture, but it was 
clear that the citizen had expressed a strong and dominant posture.  
 In a separate interaction, the Kernersville police officer arrived in a parking lot of 
a shopping center where a third party had called in a complaint regarding a domestic 
dispute between a man and woman. The officer arrived, exited his vehicle, and asked the 
man who had been described by the third party, “What’s going on?” The officer’s initial 
verbal contact did not assert his authority, nor did it elicit a specific response from the 
citizen. The citizen responded with an assertive, non-submissive tone of voice that 
nothing was going on. The officer explained that he had received a complaint of a 
domestic dispute, and the citizen responded with a very assertive tone that no fight had 
occurred and that he and the female were joking around. The citizen then told the officer 
in an indignant and aggressive tone that he should leave, thereby assuming dominance 
over the officer and the right to terminate the interaction. The officer responded with a 
very aggressive and assertive tone, informing the citizen that the investigation would 
continue until the officer was satisfied. The officer’s tone implied threat of criminal 
penalty and physical force, while at the same time iterating the officer’s authoritative 
position as a law enforcement officer. At this point, the citizen became submissive, 
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speaking only when directly questioned, and speaking in a much softer, less assertive 
tone of voice. 
 In the case of both of these interactions, the citizen was coded as less than fully 
compliant; however, in neither case was the citizen coded as completely noncompliant. 
The coding scheme could not encompass the dynamic and intricate nature of these 
dominance competitions. I was forced to make an estimation of the total compliance of 
the citizen over the course of the interaction, and to a great extent, the citizen’s degree of 
compliance was closely related to his/her degree of submission. However, an 
ethnographic study of the dramatological factors which influence officer/citizen 
compliance interactions would provide a much fuller description of the nature of these 
complex and important social interactions. 
The development of these two officer/citizen interaction provides anecdotal 
evidence regarding compliance interactions on the whole. However, they do offer a 
salient example of the dynamic nature of compliance negotiation. The change in this 
citizen’s compliance over the course of the interaction illustrates the artificial character of 
describing compliance through a rating based on any single point in the interaction. 
Similarly, this interaction demonstrates the evolution of an officer’s methods of obtaining 
compliance. A qualitative analysis of this interaction reveals the dynamic exchange 
engaged in by the officer and the citizen, which could not be captured by documentation 
of quantitative factors alone. 
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Discussion of Research Methods  
Having already discussed the potential shortcomings of the theories which 
underpin this research, I would like to discuss the possibility that the lack of significant 
support for either theory actually is a result of the research methods employed. This study 
gathered data using a unique data source. However, the data source has some severe 
limitations. The point of view of the cruiser-mounted video systems insures that the vast 
majority of interactions viewed will be traffic-related. While this removes any potential 
interference of the researcher into the interactions under review, it prevents inclusion of a 
more varied sample of police/citizen compliance interactions. This fact may account for 
the extreme difference in terms of compliance levels between this study and the 
Mastrofski et al. (1996) study. The prior research revealed a binary noncompliance level 
of 22% whereas this study revealed a binary noncompliance level of 1%. Multiple factors 
can account for this huge discrepancy. First, this study was conducted in a less populated 
jurisdiction than that of Richmond, Virginia. Second, the Kernersville PD has much less 
officer diversity within the ranks than that of Richmond PD, with no cases of interactions 
involving non-white officers from the Kernersville Police Department. However, I am 
inclined to believe that the fact that researchers in the Mastrofski et al. (1996) study had 
the ability to observe officer/citizen interactions which occurred inside residences or 
away from the patrol vehicle might have accounted for at least part of the variation in 
compliance rates, and in research findings overall. 
 Another potential methodological problem involves the measurement of the 
independent variables. The nature of the data source required that proxy variables be used 
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to assess numerous independent variables. For example, in order to assess the normative 
factor of the level of authority by officers, the Mastrofski et al. (1996) study recorded the 
officer’s years of experience and age. However, use of dash cam footage required that the 
officer’s age be approximated, which necessitated the creation of large age ranges in 
order to insure some level of reliability, but which reduced variation.  
Improvements  
 The results of this study suggest numerous avenues for improvement. First, the 
scope of this study should have included only officer/citizen compliance interactions 
initiated during traffic stops. While the data source of cruiser mounted video systems has 
a great deal of potential for use in sociological study, researchers should realize that, at its 
current level of development, the video systems were designed and are best suited for 
recording traffic stops. In order to study social interactions of any kind, researchers 
require as much sensory information as possible. Obviously, a calculated tradeoff is made 
when a researcher chooses to confine his/her field of observation to what has been 
recorded through a camera lens and on a microphone. However, in my attempts to sample 
a wider range of officer/citizen interactions, including interactions that did not involve 
traffic enforcement and thus were not in an area adjacent to the dash-cam, I ended up 
sampling many interactions which were unusable due to inadequate visual footage of the 
officer/citizen interaction. This, in part, accounts for the fact that the sample only 
included 200 interactions from the footage database of Kernersville Police Department, 
despite the fact that the goal was to view 300 interactions. 
117 
 
 
 This study would have been better served to had focused solely on officer/citizen 
compliance interactions during traffic stops rather than attempting to make statements 
regarding the entirety of officer/citizen compliance interactions. Due to the decision to 
seek a broader field of inquiry, followed by the overrepresentation of traffic-based 
officer/citizen interactions in the sample, serious reliability concerns emerged.  
Due to these factors, this study can only address citizen compliance during traffic stops. It 
is possible that the context of the interaction is an important factor to consider for 
understanding citizen compliance to officer commands. Additionally, the difference 
between the representation of traffic-based interactions sampled in current research and 
those sampled in the Mastrofski et al. (1996) study also may account for some of the 
variation in the results obtained by these two studies.  
 This research also would have benefited from an expanded sample taken from the 
King Police Department footage database. However, when planning the study, the 
officers of King PD were using cruiser-mounted video systems which recorded onto VHS 
and 8mm tapes. The database consisted of a bookcase housing these tapes. The format of 
this database made extensive sampling of officer/citizen interactions extremely difficult. 
Coding such tapes would have necessitated fast forwarding through large amounts of tape 
in search of useable footage of officer/citizen compliance interactions.  
With such limitations in mind, the study drew primarily from the Kernersville 
Police Department’s digital footage database, using a smaller sample from the King PD 
as a check on the generalizability of the analysis of the Kernersville data. During the time 
period during which the study was being conducted on the Kernersville PD database, 
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King PD switched its cruiser mounted video system from VHS/8mm to a digital system 
similar to the system used by Kernersville PD. I was unaware of this change until I went 
back to King PD to collect the second, smaller sample. However, it was still necessary to 
collect a smaller sample at King PD because the King PD system had been in place for 
only a period of months and therefore contained a smaller number of video files when 
compared to the Kernersville PD database. 
 Had it been practical, this study could have included samples from databases of 
more law enforcement agencies. In the future, this should become increasingly 
convenient as more and more law enforcement agencies change from analog systems to 
digital cruiser mounted video systems. The advantage of the digital system is that a 
researcher can sample and view officer/citizen interactions with quickness and ease.  
 As discussed previously, a study of officer/citizen compliance interactions would 
be well served by a more qualitative approach than the one used by this study. 
Compliance interactions are far too dynamic and complex to be adequately encompassed 
by a quantitative analysis. I am convinced by my experience with this study that an 
ethnomethodological examination of officers and citizens involved in compliance 
interactions could yield a great deal of added understanding to this under-researched 
field. 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 Sociological research into power and obedience has been both deep and wide. A 
diversity of macro and micro level theories have been put forward to explain the nature of 
this social phenomena (Allan 2006; Aronson 1954; Bendix 1960; Blau 2003; Blumer 
1969; Cialdini 2001; Durkhiem 1897; Erikson 1966; Marx 1857) and researchers have 
applied these theories to a variety of social settings. However, research into the role of 
power/obedience between law enforcement officers and citizens has been much more 
limited (Mastrofski et al. 1996). 
 What factors influence a citizen’s likelihood of voluntarily complying with officer 
commands? As already has been mentioned, citizens are more likely to comply if they are 
emotional or in interactions initiated by someone other than an officer. Citizens are less 
likely to comply in interactions where officers use threats. In cases where a citizen 
complies with an officer’s initial command, citizens are less likely to comply with 
subsequent commands, and a citizen is less likely to comply in cases where an officer 
demonstrates respect for them. Also, it appears that a citizen’s likelihood of compliance 
may vary based on the department the officer represents or the jurisdiction in which the 
interaction is taking place.  
This study seeks to expand understandings of compliance. Every day, individuals 
are compelled to comply with laws, norms, and customs. Research has shown that in 
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most instances individuals insure their own compliance and the compliance of those 
around them through various informal means. In the case of the more formal social 
interaction of law enforcement officers and citizens, the commands of officers are 
supported by legal sanctions, visible displays of official authority, and an underlying 
threat of physical force as demonstrated by a displayed arsenal of weapons. In the vast 
majority of cases, whether because of social convention or submission to the 
aforementioned sanctions and threats, citizens are compliant with the commands of 
officers. Even individuals with lengthy criminal records and who have fought with or fled 
from officers on prior occasions are typically compliant with the vast majority of officer 
commands. The purpose of this research was to assess what factors might increase or 
decrease a citizen’s likelihood of voluntarily complying with officer commands.  
 This research does provide greater insight into the nature of the officer/citizen 
compliance interaction. These interactions are complicated and dynamic. The influence 
of certain factors is understandable. Citizens who are threatened by officers are less likely 
to comply. However, the influence of some factors is counterintuitive and not predicted 
by the theories used here. For example, why would a citizen be more likely to fully 
comply with the commands of an officer who is disrespectful towards him/her? Perhaps 
the outcome of this research is that it explored the topic of officer/citizen compliance 
interactions deeply enough to discover how little is truly understood about this type of 
interaction.   
The literature surrounding citizen compliance to officer commands has treated 
compliance as an outcome. If citizen compliance is viewed in this way, the goal of 
121 
 
 
research is to determine what factors allow the officer to influence a citizen to voluntarily 
comply with commands. This perspective views officer traits and behaviors, citizen traits 
and behaviors, and situational factors as variables which, when summed, produce either 
citizen voluntary compliance or failure to voluntarily comply. It is with this very 
viewpoint that the current study was conducted. However, our results reveal the 
shortcoming of this perspective, recognizing that judging compliance solely by the final 
disposition misses how that compliance has been negotiated throughout the interaction.  
This research examined a total of sixty-three quantitative factors within each 
sampled interaction. The breadth of this examination encompassed the theories of social 
interactionism and judgmental heuristics, and some additional situational and 
demographic factors. However, of the 63 factors, only six proved to have a causal 
relationship with citizen compliance, and only two affected compliance as predicted by a 
theoretical perspective.  
Yet, where the quantitative analysis failed to provide a deeper understanding of 
citizen voluntary compliance, the limited qualitative analysis conducted revealed a 
glimpse of the remarkable dynamics of officer/citizen compliance interactions. This 
qualitative analysis calls sociologists and law enforcement officers alike to lay aside the 
current view of citizen compliance as an outcome to be reached. It is understandable for 
researchers to view the compliance interactions as akin to a competition, with the officer 
seeking to obtain voluntary compliance from a citizen and either succeeding or failing. 
However, this form of assessment requires that the observer wait until the resolution of 
the interaction, assign the resolution an “outcome,” and then work their way backwards 
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to classify the degree of compliance which led to this “outcome.” This process is similar 
to observing a cinematic film and then assigning it a number of stars to denote its ranking 
so that it can be compared with other films. Such rankings are subjective, imposed on a 
film in order to create a narrative of how it ranks, while at the same time failing to 
provide greater understanding of the film itself.  
As this research demonstrates, the vast majority of officer/citizen interactions 
reach their conclusion with the citizen having voluntarily complied, as defined in this 
study. Yet, such a classification does not express the complexities or dynamics of the 
compliance interaction. Theoretical perspectives of compliance would be better served to 
explain the processes through which compliance is negotiated, rather than focusing on 
factors which influence compliance. In the case of this study, the affect of traits, 
behaviors and situational factors failed to provide a deeper understanding of the 
compliance interaction. On the other hand, an analysis of the way in which officers and 
citizens enacted dominance and submission, compliance and noncompliance, 
demonstrates the non- linear nature of compliance, with peaks of defiance and valleys of 
submission on the part of the citizen, and corresponding responses of dominance and 
informality on the part of the officer.  
Future research into this topic would be well served to ask the question: how is 
compliance negotiated in officer/citizen compliance interactions? Such a study could 
produce a rich narrative concerning the interplay of officer action and response with the 
action and response of the citizen. It is even possible that when the dynamics of these 
interactions are more fully understood, factors, such as traits, behaviors and situational 
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features, can once again be assessed to determine their affect on compliance interaction 
processes. 
This study, hopefully, serves as a call for further research into the topic of 
officer/citizen compliance interactions. An increased understanding of the dynamics 
involved in these interactions will allow sociologists to provide policy advice to police 
that could save the lives of officers and citizens by preventing violence during such 
exchanges. Further, by understanding the social forces at work in officer/citizen 
interactions, sociologists can better understand social interactions of all types that involve 
participants with different levels of power, such as employers/employees or 
teachers/students.  
This study sought to view officer/citizen interactions in a unique way. By utilizing 
the technology of cruiser mounted video systems, it was possible to assess officer/citizen 
compliance interactions without influencing the interaction in any way. Footage of 
interactions could be randomly sampled from a large population of data files and viewed 
in an efficient manner. Further, the same footage could be reviewed several times so that 
either qualitative or quantitative factors could be explored carefully.  
The use of dashboard-mounted cameras in patrol cruisers has been growing 
throughout U. S. law enforcement agencies for well over a decade. However, as 
technology advances, from VHS or 8 mm tapes to digital systems, it is now a growing 
trend for agencies to possess a digital database of dash cam footage. This data base is 
easily accessible and contains high quality recordings of virtually all formal 
officer/citizen encounters that occur within view of the camera system.  
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The potential value of this new data source to sociology is quite profound. Social 
science researchers are forever caught between desires to view human behavior in its 
most natural setting, while minimizing the risk of altering that behavior due to the 
researcher’s presence. A database of footage from cruiser-mounted video systems 
provides the best possib le balance between the two concerns of the social science 
researcher. What is more, the technology has developed to the point where a random 
sample can be taken and viewed in a safe and convenient format.  
I believe that examining footage from video databanks, such as dash-cam and 
other surveillance formats will prove to be a revolutionary new data source for social 
scientists. As our society increasingly utilizes Foucault’s “panopticon,” (Staples 2000) 
the resulting mountains of footage can be used not only by agents of social control, but 
also by social researchers seeking to understand the social interactions of those being 
surveyed. The databanks of footage will exist regardless of whether or not social 
scientists take advantage of them, but for now, the potential is unrealized for such 
information to be used to promote social understanding. If social scientists do not seek to 
develop this information resource, it will continue to be used as merely a tool of 
management and crime control. 
The work of law enforcement is important for maintaining the safety of our 
communities. Law enforcement professionals and social scientists are constantly working 
to improve the tactics and strategies of law enforcement officers with the goal of 
increasing officer efficacy in their communities while improving officer safety. 
Examination of citizen responses to officer commands is a deep mine of information with 
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the potential to inform policy makers and law enforcement training personnel alike. This 
study seeks to conduct just this form of examination, adding to the literature of a crucial 
social interaction which has been sorely under-researched. 
The administration of law enforcement agencies, no doubt, has numerous 
concerns regarding the potential criticisms and external interference which could result 
from widespread analysis of their cruiser-mounted camera footage databases. Prior to 
now, law enforcement has been able to maintain some degree of self-direction by 
asserting that outsiders cannot have a full understanding of the work of law enforcement 
unless they have been law enforcement officers themselves.  
The possible concerns of law enforcement administrators are understandable. 
However, in order to attain the full potential benefits that could be wrought from 
systematic analysis of dashboard mounted video footage databases, law enforcement 
agencies and social scientists will have to work in union. Law enforcement trainers and 
administrators are more than qualified to assess dashcam footage for tactical and legal 
assessments of the work of their patrol officers. Yet, the theoretical and analytical 
techniques of the social scientist provide a depth of understanding of the interactions 
taking place which would be difficult for law enforcement agencies to acquire in other 
ways. A mutually beneficial relationship between these two fields could produce not only 
deeper theoretical understanding of officer/citizen interactions in particular, and unequal 
power relationship interactions in general, but practical insights which could improve the 
compliance eliciting techniques of officers, aiding their ability to serve the public safely 
and effectively.  
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Such a relationship will require a great deal of trust and professionalism on the 
part of all parties involved. Interactions between social science researchers and law 
enforcement officials are just as nuanced and dynamic as the officer/citizen compliance 
interactions that have been discussed here. Yet, the benefits to sociology, law 
enforcement, and the public, are far too precious to ignore. 
127 
 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
 
Akers, Ronald L. and Christine S. Sellers. 2004. Criminological Theories. Los Angeles, 
CA: Roxbury Publishing Company.  
Allan, Ken. 2006. Contemporary Social and Sociological Theory: Visualizing Social 
Worlds. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge. 
Aronson, Elliot. 1954. The Social Animal. New York: Freeman.  
Bendix, Reinhard. 1960. Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait. Garden City, NY: 
Doubleday.  
Black, Donald. 1976. The Behavior of Law. San Diego: Academic Press. 
Black, Donald. 1980. The Manners and Customs of the Police. New York: Academic 
Press. 
Blau, Peter. 2003. Exchange and Power in Social Life. Transaction Publishers. 
Blumer, Herbert. 1969. Symbolic Interactionism. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 
Inc. 
Cialdini, Robert B. 2001. Influence: Science and Practice. Needham Heights, MA: Allyn 
& Bacon.  
Cialdini, Robert B., Noah J. Goldstein. 2004. “Social Influence: Compliance and 
Conformity.” Annual Review of Psychology 55:591–621. 
Cialdini, Robert B. and Melanie R. Trost 1998:152Turner, Jonathan H. (editor). 2001 
Handbook of Sociological Theory. New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers. 
128 
 
 
Denzin, Norman K. 1971. “The Logic of Naturalistic Inquiry.” Social Forces 50:166-182. 
Durkheim, Emile. 1897 [1951]. Suicide: A Study in Sociology. New York: Free Press. 
Erikson, Kai T. 1966. Wayward Puritans. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company.  
Euwema, Martin C., Nicolien Kop, and Arnold B. Bakker. 2004. “The Behavior of Police 
Officers in Conflict Situations: How Burnout and Reduced Dominance Contribute 
to Better Outcomes.” Work and Stress 18:23-38.  
Haney, Craig, Curtis Banks and Phillip Zimbardo. (1973). “Interpersonal Dynamics in a 
Simulated Prison.” International Journal of Criminology and Penology 1: 69-97. 
 Hammersley, Martyn and Paul Atkinson. 1995. Ethnography Principles in Practice. 
London: Routledge. 
Marx, Karl. 1857 [1993]. Grundrisse. USA: Penguin Books. 
Mastrofski, Stephen D., Robert E. Worden, and Jeffrey B. Snipes. 1995. “Law 
Enforcement in a Time of Community Policing.” Criminology 33:539-63. 
Mastrofski, Stephen D., Jeffrey B. Snipes and Anne E. Supina. 1996. “Compliance on 
Demand: The Public’s Response to Specific Police Requests.” Journal of 
Research in Crime and Delinquency 33:269-305. 
McCarthy, Bill. 2002. “New Economics of Sociological Criminology.” Annual Review of 
Sociology 28: 417-442. 
Muir, William K., Jr. 1977. Police: Streetcorner Politicians. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Neuendorf, Kimberly A. 2002. The Content Analysis Guidebook. Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage Publications. 
129 
 
 
Norušis, Marija J. 2007. SPSS 15.0 Advanced Statistical Procedures Companion. Upper 
Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
O’Connell, Ann A. 2006. Logistic regression models for ordinal response variables. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
Porter, Louise E. and Laurence J. Alison. 2006. “Behavioral Coherence in Group 
Robbery: A Circumplex Model of Offender and Victim Interactions.” Aggressive 
Behavior 32:330-334. 
Reiss, Albert J., Jr. 1984. “Consequences of Compliance and Deterrence Models of Law 
Enforcement for the Exercise of Police Discretion.” Law and Contemporary 
Problems 47:88-122. 
Renzetti, Clair M., Damiel J. Curran and Patrick J. Carr, eds. 2003 Theories of Crime: A 
Reader. Boston: Pearson Education Inc. 
Rock, Paul. 1995. “Sociology and the Stereotype of the Police.” Journal of Law and 
Society 22:17-25. 
Staples, William G. 2000. Everyday Survelillance. USA: Rowman and Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc. 
Sunshine, Jason and Tom Tyler. 2003. “Moral Solidarity, Identification with the 
Community, and the Importance of Procedural Justice: The Police as Prototypical 
Representatives of a Group’s Moral Values.” Social Psychology Quarterly 
66,2:153-65. 
Sykes, Richard E. and Edward E. Brent. 1983. Policing: A Social Behaviorist 
Perspective. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. 
130 
 
 
Tedeschi, James T. and Richard B. Felson. 1993. Aggression and Violence: Social 
Interactionist Perspectives. Washington, DC: American Psychological 
Association.  
Terrill, William, and Stephen D. Mastrofski. 2002. “Situational and Officer-Based 
Determinants of Police Coercion.” Justice Quarterly 19,2:215-49. 
Thompson, George, and Jerry B. Jenkins. 1993. Verbal Judo: The Gentle Art of 
Persuasion. New York: William Morrow and Co. Inc. 
Turner, Jonathan H., ed. 2001. Handbook of Sociological Theory. New York: Kluwer 
Academic/Plenum Publishers. 
131 
 
 
APPENDIX 
CODING SHEET 
 
 
Case Number ______________ 
 
___ Kernersville PD traffic stop citation 
                                                                        ___ Kernersville PD traffic stop warning 
___ Kernersville PD traffic accident  
___ Kernersville PD motorists assist 
___ Kernersville PD DWI 
___ Kernersville PD traffic stop felony 
___ Kernersville PD use of force 
___ Kernersville PD arrest (non-DWI) 
___ Kernersville PD investigation 
___ King PD A squad 
___ King PD B squad     
___ King PD C squad 
                                     ___ King PD D squad      
___ King PD unknown 
         ___ Kernersville PD unknown 
          ___ Other  Specify: ____________ 
 
Section A. Demographics : 
 
(This section assumes visibility of those present in the interaction) 
 
Primary Officer Characteristics 
 
 
 
1. What Police Department does the primary officer work for? 
 
___ King PD   
___ Kernersville PD 
___ Other 
 
2. Gender          ___ Male    ___ Female  
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3. Age   ___ 19 or under  
___ 20-39  
___ 40-59   
___ 60 or over 
___ Unknown 
 
 
4. Race   ___ American Indian   
___ Asian    
___ Black    
___ White    
 ___ Unknown 
 ___ Other, specify: ____________________ 
 
 
5. Ethnicity ___ Hispanic 
___ Non-Hispanic 
___ Unknown 
 
 
 
 
6. What is the approximate physical build of the primary officer?  
___ Small 
 ___ Medium 
 ___ Large  
 ___ Very large  
___ Muscular 
___ Obese 
___ Unknown 
___ Other,  
specify: ____________________ 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Primary Citizen Characteristics 
 
7. Gender          _____ Male    ____ Female  
 
8. Age   ___ 19 or under  
___ 20-39  
___ 40-59   
___ 60 or over 
___ Unknown 
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9. Race   ___ American Indian   
___ Asian    
___ Black    
___ White    
 ___ Unknown 
 ___ Other, specify: ____________________ 
 
 
 
10. Ethnicity ___ Hispanic 
___ Non-Hispanic 
___ Unknown 
 
 
11.  Does the primary citizen appear to have any mental illness/handicap?   
___ Yes  
     ___ No   
      ___ Unknown 
 
 Notes: 
 
 
 
 
  
12. What is the approximate physical build of the primary citizen? 
___ Slight   
 ___ Medium 
  ___ Large  
  ___ Very large  
___ Muscular 
___ Obese 
 ___ Unknown 
___ Other,  
specify: ____________________ 
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13.  Does the primary citizen appear to speak/understand English fluently/easily?  
___ Yes  
      ___ No   
      ___ Unknown 
 
 Notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
14.   What is the approximate monetary value of the vehicle, if any, being occupied 
by the primary citizen during the interaction?  
___ No vehicle  
___ Low  
___ Low-Medium  
___ Medium 
___ High-Medium 
___ High 
___ Unknown 
   
---------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Secondary Officers and Citizens 
 
 
15. How many secondary officers were present in the interaction?   
___ 0  
___ 1  
      ___ 2   
             ___ 3-5 
___ >5 
___ Unknown 
 
16. How many secondary citizens were present in the interaction?   
___ 0  
___ 1  
      ___ 2   
             ___ 3-5 
___ >5 
___ Unknown 
 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
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Section B:  Description of Citizen/Officer Encounter 
 
 
17. What initiates the officer/citizen interaction?  
  ___ Officer- initiated investigation     
  ___ Primary citizen request for law enforcement    
  ___ Secondary citizen request for law enforcement   
  ___ Third party request for law enforcement    
  ___ Unknown 
  ___ Other,    specify: ___________________  
     
 
18. What crime or conduct is under investigation? (check all that apply) 
___ Speeding offense 
___ Miscellaneous Traffic offense 
  ___ City ordinance violation 
___ DWI 
___ Misdemeanor offense, specify: _____________________ 
  ___ Felony offense,  specify: _____________________ 
  ___ Unknown 
  ___ Other,    specify: _____________________ 
 
 
 
19. What is the disposition of officer/citizen interaction?  
      ___ Information given  
___ Verbal warning given  
      ___ Written warning given  
      ___ Citation issued  
___ Arrest made     
      ___ Other, specify: ________ 
 Notes: 
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20. What time of day does the interaction take place? ___ Day time 
___ Night Time 
___ Unknown 
 
 Notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
21. What is the location of the interaction?  
 ___ Street/highway  
     ___ Public Vehicular Area (not street/highway)  
     ___ Private Property  
     ___ Unknown 
     ___ Other, specify: _______________________ 
 Notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
22. In what way did the primary citizen respond to officer’s verbal command(s)? 
 
___ Voluntarily Comply 
___ Failed to Voluntarily Comply 
___ N/A 
 
 
23. In what way did the secondary citizen(s) respond to officer’s verbal command(s)? 
 
___ Voluntarily Comply 
___ Failed to Voluntarily Comply 
___ N/A 
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(for the following question use scale 1-10 with 1 representing complete 
voluntary compliance and 10 representing a complete failure to voluntarily comply) 
 
24. To what degree did the primary citizen voluntarily comply with the verbal 
commands of the officers present?  ______ 
 
Notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
25. How did the voluntary compliance of the primary citizen change over the course 
of the interaction?  
 
 
 
 
 
26. What approach, if any, were employed by officer(s) to elicit voluntary 
compliance? (check all that apply)  
___ Encouragement  
___ Intimidation 
___ Overt threat 
___ Humor 
    ___ None 
    ___ Other, specify: ___________________________ 
Notes: 
 
 
 
 
27. In what ways, if any, did the primary officer’s methods of eliciting voluntary 
compliance change over the course of the interaction?  
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Section C. Injury and Violence 
 
 
28. Did the officer(s) arrive at an already violent situation?     ___ Yes  
   ___ No 
            ___ Unknown  
Notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
29. Did the interaction become violent?   ___ Yes  
___ No 
       ___ Unknown  
Notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
Officer(s) 
 
 
30. Did the officer(s) grip/place hands on any weapon(s)? ___ Yes 
___ No 
Type: __________________ 
 
Notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
31. Did the officer(s) brandish any weapon(s)? ___ Yes 
___ No 
Type: __________________ 
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32. Did officer(s) use force?   __ Yes ___ No 
 
Notes: 
 
 
 
 
  
33. Did officer(s) meet with physical resistance?     ___ Yes ___ No 
 
Notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
----------------------------------------------- 
Primary Citizen 
 
 
 
34. Did the primary citizen make an overt threat to use force?   __ Yes ___ No 
 
Notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
35. Did the primary citizen brandish any weapon(s)? ___ Yes 
___ No 
Type: __________________ 
 
 
 
36. Did the primary citizen use force?   __ Yes ___ No 
 
Notes: 
 
 
 
 
----------------------------------------------- 
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Secondary Citizen(s) 
 
37. Did any secondary citizen(s) make an overt threat to use force?                
___ Yes 
___ No 
___ N/A 
 
Notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
38. Did any secondary citizen(s) brandish any weapon(s)? ___ Yes 
___ No 
Type: __________________ 
 
 
 
39. Did any secondary citizen(s) use force?     ___ Yes 
___ No 
 
Notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
----------------------------------------------- 
Section E:  Social Interactionist Perspective 
 
 
Normative Variables 
 
Respect 
40. How do officer(s) treat the citizen(s)?   ___ Respect 
___ Neutral 
___ Disrespect 
___ Unknown 
 
Notes: 
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41. Do the officer(s) refer to the citizen(s) by a title? (ex. Mr./Ms., Sir/Ma’am)  
     
__ Yes    
__ No 
          __ Unknown 
Notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
Prior Knowledge 
 
42. Is there any indication that officer(s) have past experience with or knowledge of 
the primary citizen?  
___ Yes 
___ No 
___ Unknown 
 
Notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
Officer Skills 
 
43. Does the primary officer utilize verbal judo interaction techniques? 
___ Yes  
___ No 
          ___ Unknown 
Notes: 
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Evidence Strength 
 
44. Does the primary officer observe a violation of law by the primary citizen?  
___ Yes  
___ No 
          ___ Unknown 
 Notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
45. Does the primary officer obtain physical evidence (to include radar readings) 
implicating the citizen in a violation of law? 
 
___ Yes  
___ No 
          ___ Unknown 
Notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
46. Does the primary citizen give a confession of a violation of law in the presence of 
the officer(s)? 
___ Yes  
___ No 
          ___ Unknown 
Notes: 
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Instrumental 
 
irrationality 
 
 
47. Was the primary officer notably emotional during the interaction?  
___ Yes 
___ No  
       ___ Unknown  
 Notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
48. Was the primary citizen notably emotional during the interaction?  
___ Yes 
___ No  
       ___ Unknown  
 Notes: 
 
 
49. What, if any, was the level of impairment, due to substances, of the primary 
citizen?  
___ None   
      ___ Slight 
             ___ Moderate 
___ High 
             ___ Unknown 
 
 Notes: 
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Problem seriousness 
 
50. How serious is the problem under investigation?   ___ Traffic 
___ Minor offense 
___ Drugs  
___ Serious  
___ Unknown 
 
 Notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
Section F: Judgmental Heuristics  
 
 
authority 
 
51. What type of clothing is being worn by the primary officer?     
       ___  Class A uniform 
___ Class B uniform 
___ Plain cloths  
       ___  Other, specify: _____ 
Notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
52. What is the state of the primary officer’s clothing.  ___  Tidy 
___ Unkempt 
       ___  Other, specify: _____ 
Notes: 
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53. Did the primary officer possess rank insignias?         ___ Yes 
___ No 
Notes (include description of insignias): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
54. Does the primary officer demonstrate legal knowledge/expertise? 
__ Yes    
__ No 
          __ Unknown 
 Notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
55. Do officer(s) notify citizen(s) of the agency that they represent? 
__ Yes    
__ No 
          __ Unknown 
 Notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
56. Are lights and/or sirens activated on the patrol cruiser? (check all that apply) 
__ Lights   
__ Sirens  
__ None 
          __ Unknown 
 Notes: 
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57. Do officer(s) inform citizen(s) of the crime under investigation?  
 
__ Yes    
__ No 
          __ Unknown 
 Notes: 
 
 
receprocation 
 
 
58. Does the officer(s) provide the citizen with an form of assistance/service during 
the interaction? (check all that apply) 
 
__ officer(s) notifys the citizen of a mechanical  problem with the citizens car  
__ officer(s) give the citizen navigational directions 
__ officer(s) give the citizen advice on what to do at his/her court date 
__ officer(s) inform the citizen that charges against him/her will be reduced 
__ officer(s) provide other form off assistance/service to the citizen 
__ officer(s) provide no assistance/service to the citizen 
 
Notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
59. Do officer(s) make any concession at the request of citizen(s)? 
__ Yes    
__ No 
          __ Unknown 
 Notes: 
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consistency 
 
60. Does the officer begin the exchange by first asking the citizen for 
license/registration?      __ Yes    
       __ No 
   
 Notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
61. Does the citizen comply with this initial command?  __ Yes    
       __ No 
__ N/A 
 
   
 Notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
62. Does the officer begin the exchange by first asking for a citizen to come over to 
where the officer is to talk with him/her?   __ Yes    
       __ No 
   
 Notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
63. Does the citizen comply with this initial command?  __ Yes    
       __ No 
          __ N/A 
 Notes: 
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64. Does the officer begin the exchange by first asking for some other minor act of 
compliance?       __ Yes    
       __ No 
__ N/A   
 Notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
65. Does the citizen comply with this/these initial command(s)?   
__ Yes    
__ No 
          __ N/A 
 Notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
Conformity 
 
 
66. Do secondary officer(s) comply with the commands, if any, of the primary officer 
while in the presence of citizens?   __ Yes    
       __ No 
__ N/A 
          __ Unknown 
 Notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
liking 
 
67. Does an officers advocate leniency for the citizen in the presence of the citizen?  
       __ Yes    
       __ No 
          __ Unknown 
 Notes: 
 
--------------------------------------- 
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Section G: Miscellaneous  
 
 
68. How does the primary citizen treat the officer(s)?  ___ Respect 
___ Neutral 
___ Disrespect 
___ Unknown 
 
Notes: 
 
 
 
 
69. Does the primary citizen refer to officer(s) by a title? (ex. Mr./Ms., Sir/Ma’am)  
     
__ Yes    
__ No 
          __ Unknown 
Notes: 
 
 
 
 
70. Does an officer ever notify the primary citizen that the interaction is being 
recorded? 
___ Yes  
___ No 
          ___ Unknown 
Notes: 
 
 
 
 
 
71. Are there any Dramatulogical issues which are observable in this compliance 
interaction? 
